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1. Introduction: studying vertically 
integrated approaches to citizen-led 
reforms 
Joy Aceron and Francis Isaac 
1.1 Introducing the research and 
its significance
The Philippines has had a long experience of 
state–society engagement to introduce reforms in 
government and politics. Forces from civil society 
and social movements interface with reform-oriented 
leaders in government to make governance more 
responsive, to introduce policy reforms and / or make 
government more accountable. 
Though this has been a well-discussed strategy to 
introduce reform in the Philippines among governance 
reform actors, there is very little research done on it. 
One exception well known in the Philippines is the work 
of Saturnino Borras (1998) on agrarian reform where 
he coined the term ‘bibingka strategy’ as the strategy 
employed to successfully push for the implementation 
of agrarian reform, especially in areas considered as 
‘local authoritarian enclaves’. After this application, 
there has been no other initiative with state–society 
engagement studied using this framework, though 
arguably the bibingka strategy has informed much of 
the subsequent campaigns of social movements in the 
country in influencing policy change.
Meanwhile, an approach to civil society engagement in 
governance was developed in the 2000s that focused 
on fighting corruption. This approach integrates civil 
society monitoring in government processes to serve 
as a transparency mechanism that aims to improve 
performance and deter corruption in the bureaucracy. 
This is later referred to as social accountability (SAcc).
Due to the relative openness of the Philippine 
Government to SAcc initiatives, as well as the increasing 
support from international actors, SAcc initiatives have 
multiplied over the years all over the country exhibiting 
varied features, but generally aimed at ensuring that 
standard processes, quantity, time, quality and cost 
are complied with by government and / or contractors 
(duty bearers). Today, there is an emerging question of 
how to sustain these initiatives to ensure their impact 
on governance and politics, which also raises the 
questions of which ones and what features have been 
most effective and should therefore be sustained. 
These points of inquiry are also being reflected upon 
in the international arena. The paper of American 
academic–activist Jonathan Fox in 2014 entitled Social 
accountability: what does the evidence really say? 
scans the state of evidence on the impact of social 
accountability initiatives and concludes that while the 
existing empirical evidence is mixed, strategic approaches 
seem more promising: “Strategic approaches to SAcc 
… bolster enabling environments for collective action, 
scale up citizen engagement beyond the local arena and 
attempt to bolster governmental capacity to respond to 
voice” (Fox 2014: 35). 
One example of a strategic approach is ‘vertical 
integration’. Fox argues that “vertical integration of 
local, regional and national civil society oversight” has 
the greatest potential of addressing corruption and 
exclusion. This is so because “corruption and social 
exclusion are produced by vertically integrated power 
structures. Insofar as multiple links in the chain of 
governance facilitate the deflection of civil society 
oversight and advocacy, effective responses require 
parallel processes that are also vertically integrated” 
(Ibid.: 31).
These theoretical propositions on what kind of strategy 
works best for strengthening accountability and 
instituting reforms are built on a review of evidence. As 
such, they are ripe for testing, deepening and enriching 
through application to particular country contexts, 
and through sharing and ‘truth-testing’ with social 
and political actors engaged in exercising voice and 
claiming accountability. 
The Philippines offers an ideal context to explore 
Fox’s propositions, because of certain aspects of the 
interplay of citizen engagement in accountability, 
sustainability and impact. In 2015, we started a 
research project on ‘Vertically Integrated’ Advocacy 
and Monitoring Initiatives in the Philippines. The study 
aimed to understand what makes civil society initiatives 
‘successful’ in achieving their target goals at a given 
period of time, and reflect on how the gains from 
‘successful’ initiatives can be deepened and sustained 
in a way that substantive changes in Philippine politics 
and society can be achieved. 
The challenge of sustainability that various SAcc 
initiatives confront has a lot to do with the structural 
deficit of accountability in Philippine politics and 
governance. There is a need for the different SAcc 
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initiatives to see beyond their usually focused, 
compartmentalised and technocratised engagement 
for their results and gains to be sustained. This will be 
critical to see how these initiatives impact on broader 
developmental and democratisation goals.
The challenge of impact confronting the reform-
oriented initiatives in the country that rely on citizen 
empowerment (particularly their ability to make a 
difference that is felt by ordinary people) concerns 
their ability and willingness to learn from each 
other, consolidate their efforts and define a common 
accountability strengthening agenda that cuts across 
their respective campaigns and traverses a wider 
spectrum of arenas for change. 
This study, hence, is deemed significant in practice 
in providing insights on what has worked in civil 
society monitoring and advocacy that aims to improve 
state responsiveness and accountability, as well as 
in providing insights on ways forward to improve the 
impact of civil society on democratisation and inclusive 
development. 
In terms of theory, this study is important in testing 
vertical integration as a framework of analysis. 
Particularly, it checks the analytical capability of 
vertical integration as a lens for investigating civil 
society initiatives – how it supports the study of civil 
society initiatives that goes beyond generalised, linear 
and simplistic propositions. It also thrashes out the 
details and nuances of the propositions of vertical 
integration as it checks how these propositions and 
characteristics play out in reality. 
1.2 Case study selection
The main approach of the research was to profile 
selected cases of civil society initiatives that have been 
able to achieve significant gains using the framework 
of vertical integration. It looks into how the different 
propositions of vertical integration came to flesh in 
the initiatives that were profiled, the limitations and 
the nuances. This report narrates how the selected 
initiatives were able to cover the different levels of 
engagement,  employing a specific set of actions by 
activating a broad variety of actors as it explains how 
such components of a ‘strategy’ contributed to the 
achievement of the campaigns’ goals. 
For the purpose of this report, the term ‘civil society’ 
is used with a recognition that different groups may 
define and apply civil society differently depending on 
their own vantage point. This is especially so in the 
Philippines, with its extensive history of movements 
and actions of social forces that are interlinked 
with international movements and forces as well. 
Though the Tocquevillian notion of civil society that is 
associational and harmonious, as well as the notion 
of civil society as counterweight to the state, are 
commonly used in the Philippines, these notions may 
not fully capture the kinds of civil society actors and 
actions profiled in this report. The more appropriate 
definition of civil society to be adopted in this report is 
that of Gramsci (1971), which looks at civil society as 
an ‘arena’ of contestation of diverse actors that try to 
gain hegemony or counter-hegemony on norms and 
ideas in society. Such definition recognises the diversity 
of actors and their views of themselves and their 
environment and the political nature of civil society as 
a space and set of actors. The definition provided by 
Jethro Pettit (personal communication), which tries 
to reconcile both the Tocquevillean and Gramscian 
definitions, best captures the use of the term ‘civil 
society’ in this report: “linked to a notion of actors, 
knowledge and spaces interacting to shape decision-
making and policy processes”.
Using vertical integration as our framework, the 
research looked into seven cases of campaigns in 
the Philippines that have registered relative ‘success’ 
in achieving their objectives through civil society 
advocacy and / or monitoring. The cases correspond 
to some of the major civil society-led campaigns 
of the post-Marcos period. These initiatives show 
how ordinary citizens respond to the most pressing 
challenges affecting governance, democracy and 
development. They also provide some of the key 
themes that continue to shape Filipino collective action, 
such as: 
• Addressing corruption and improving the government 
efficiency and responsiveness, especially in service 
delivery. The case study focuses on the education 
sector, examining Textbook Count, a joint monitoring 
project of the Department of Education and the 
Government Watch (G-Watch) programme of the 
Ateneo School of Government, which was designed 
to monitor whether the right quantity and quality of 
textbooks were being delivered to students at the 
right time following the right procedures. It is widely 
considered as one of the most successful social 
accountability initiatives in the country.
• The centuries-old struggle for land by poor peasants 
and farmers, considered as the very first social 
movement in the Philippines. The case study focuses 
on the organising efforts of two national agrarian 
reform networks, the Rural Poor Institute for Land 
and Human Rights Services (known as RIGHTS 
Network) and the Movement for Agrarian Reform and 
Social Justice (Katarungan), and their campaign with 
local farmers’ organisations on the Bondoc Peninsula. 
• The need for decent and affordable housing for the 
poor, which emerged as a consequence of rapid 
urbanisation and the migration of rural people to 
cities. The case study looks at the work of Damayan 
ng Maralitang Pilipinong Api (DAMPA, Solidarity of 
Oppressed Poor Filipinos), a network of more than 
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90,000 poor urban households, which works to 
provide “viable solutions to basic poverty problems 
endemic to the urban poor” (DAMPA 2004).
• The growth of large-scale mining, which represents 
the increasing penetration and expansion of 
corporate interests in the Philippines. The anti-
mining case study focuses on the activities of the 
Anislagan Bantay Kalikasan Task Force (ABAKATAF), 
a community-based organisation in a town in 
Surigao del Norte, formed in 2000 to fight a large 
mining company that was starting its operations in 
their locality. 
• Threats to the rights of indigenous peoples, which 
come from many directions, including from large-
scale mining. Indigenous peoples have a rich 
and long history of struggle, and the case study 
of campaigning for indigenous peoples’ rights 
examines the work of the Téduray Lambangian 
Women’s Organisation Inc. (TLWOI), a federation of 
community-based organisations which is fighting for 
the rights of indigenous women in Mindanao.
• The women’s rights agenda, which has been pursued 
through issues such as reproductive health. The 
case study examines the work of the Reproductive 
Health Advocacy Network (RHAN) to push for the 
passage of the Reproductive Health Bill, despite 
stiff opposition from the highly influential Catholic 
Church.
• The increasing demand for disaster preparedness 
as a result of growing concerns over environmental 
degradation and climate change. The case study 
focuses on the work of the Disaster Risk Reduction 
and Management (DRRM) Network Philippines, a 
large civil society coalition that aims to transform 
the country’s paradigm on disaster management 
from that of emergency relief and response to one 
that focuses on risk reduction and community 
participation.
The case study initiatives were selected on the basis of 
the following criteria: 
First, these initiatives’ immediate profile points to facets 
of vertical integration: multiple levels of engagement with 
a broad set of actors and actions involved over time. 
Second, these initiatives were ‘relatively successful’ in 
achieving concrete or tangible reforms. Success means 
that the initiative was able to do at least one of the 
following: 
• pass a progressive policy that addresses a specific 
issue or concern
• monitor government performance or service delivery 
to improve policy implementation
• ensure voice and representation of marginalised 
groups or sectors in decision-making bodies. 
Third, the selected initiatives have all achieved national 
prominence. This means that the featured initiative either 
has a presence in the National Capital Region and in at 
least five other localities, or that it has local chapters and 
is represented in national policy-making bodies.  
Fourth, organisations that either initiated or were 
involved in the campaign were willing to take part in the 
study by being available for interviews and by allowing 
the researchers to access their documents.  
Fifth, the cases present a cross-section of Philippine 
society since they offer a diverse range of issues 
featuring a wide array of actors using different 
modalities of engagement.  
Evidence on each case was collected from existing 
literature, especially those that focus on Philippine 
reform dynamics. Interviews were conducted with at 
least three key informants covering at least one area 
/ site per case, using a previously prepared interview 
guide. This was followed by a series of workshops with 
participants in these campaigns, which enabled the 
researchers to process the data, identify the findings 
that are now beginning to emerge, and reflect on how 
the research has so far been conducted.  
The analyses and conclusions found in this report are 
drawn heavily from the results of our interviews and 
from the secondary materials that we have gathered. 
The analyses of the information gathered were 
subjected to a process of validation and triangulation. 
Such processes are important, not only in validating 
the data, but also in attributing a precise action to the 
overall success of a particular reform initiative. To push 
this further, most of the cases were co-authored by 
representatives from the initiatives to ensure that the 
narrative and analysis are co-owned by the initiatives 
themselves. 
1.3 Why vertical integration as a 
framework of analysis? 
For the past two decades or so, numerous studies have 
been made on some of the most significant citizen-led 
reform initiatives in the Philippines. Though focusing on 
different individual campaigns, most of these studies 
share similar findings, attributing the success of these 
reform efforts to at least four general factors. These 
include:  
• ‘champions’ on top, or the presence of important 
reform-minded leaders in government; 
• mobilisation below, or the capacity of social 
movements and civil society organisations (CSOs) to 
organise people, gather support for their cause and 
tilt public opinion in their favour; 
• partnership / engagement between state and societal 
factors, or the constructive interaction of pro-reform 
forces to advance the desired policy measures; and 
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• leadership, which pertains to the personal skill and 
attributes of individual state reformers. 
This is the case, for example, of Textbook Count, 
because of: (1) the presence of champions in the 
Department of Education (Majeed 2011; Leung 2005); 
(2) the presence of civil society monitors and strong 
citizen participation (Guerzovich and Rosenzweig 2013; 
Arugay 2012; Leung 2005); and (3) collaborative 
engagement between the state and non-state actors 
(Guerzovich and Rosenzweig 2013; Arugay 2012).  
In a similar vein, former senator Wigberto Tañada 
argues that the success of the land reform movement 
was due to the “collaboration, cooperation and 
partnerships of various agencies of the government, 
civil society and farmers organizations” (cited in 
Carranza 2011: 409). It is an observation that is 
shared by scholars Saturnino Borras and Jennifer 
Franco, who stress the importance of “a high degree 
of social pressure from below and a high degree of 
independent state reform initiatives from above” 
(2010: 85). By arguing that the actions of state 
reformers “are likely to achieve only a limited impact” 
(Ibid.: 85), Borras and Franco conclude that the 
best conditions for reform occur when “autonomous 
mobilizations ‘from below’ by peasant movements 
and their allies meet autonomous reformist initiatives 
by reformers ‘from above’ within governmental 
institutions” (Ibid.: 86). 
On the other hand, the success of the right to housing 
initiative has been attributed more to the ability 
of housing advocates to mobilise its forces from 
below. This has been made possible by maintaining 
approximately 500 urban poor leaders, who are spread 
throughout 95 different communities. They are, in turn, 
assisted by 19 community organisers and volunteers 
who are responsible for providing grass-roots training 
and education to all DAMPA members (Castillo 2006; 
DAMPA 2004).  
Scholars attribute the relative success of the anti-
mining campaign to two main factors. The first is the 
ability of reform advocates to mobilise support from 
below. At the national level for example, Alyansa 
Tigil Mina was able to establish a strong multi-
sectoral coalition, successfully creating an extensive 
coordination network with different advocacy 
groups from the local up to the national level. The 
campaign has also generated community support 
such as in Barangay Anislagan, where a village-based 
organisation known as ABAKATAF prevented the Manila 
Mining Corporation from entering their area for nearly 
a decade (Chapoling-March 2011; Rovillos, Ramo and 
Corpuz: 2003).  
Secondly, anti-mining advocates found reform 
champions in the legislature, who were pushing for the 
enactment of an Alternative Minerals Management Bill, 
that would maximise the gains from the mining industry 
while “preventing or mitigating its adverse effects” 
(SOS–Yamang Bayan Network 2012 4).  
Two factors were also identified in explaining the 
success of the indigenous women’s campaign. The first 
is its capacity to organise at the grass roots and gather 
support from below. Believing that its political strength 
lies in basic organising work, TLWOI identified leaders 
in every village and designated community workers to 
assist them. It was also able to engage other societal 
actors and gather broad support from different groups 
and sectors such as academia, the religious community 
and other CSOs (De Vera 2007). One such example 
is the Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga Kababaihan 
sa Kanayunan (Rural Women’s Coalition), a national 
women’s network that TLWOI is part of, which provides 
technical knowledge on policy advocacy and project 
management. It has also worked with international 
organisations such as The Asia Foundation, the United 
Nations Human Rights Commission, the Center for Peace 
and Conflict Studies and the European Union on issues 
involving health, peace and security, and human rights. 
The successful campaign for the enactment of the 
Reproductive Health (RH) Law, on the other hand, was 
due to the massive support that was generated from 
below. In fact, even as the bill was being deliberated, 
the proposed measure already had overwhelming 
approval from the public. This is evident in the surveys 
made by the Social Weather Stations (SWS) in 2011 
and 2012, which indicated that eight out of ten 
Filipinos favoured the passage of the measure. The 
campaign also found a state champion in President 
Benigno Aquino lll who openly declared his support for 
reproductive health and urged his allies in Congress 
to vote for its passage (Melgar 2014; Ocampo 2014; 
Acosta-Alba 2013).  
Similarly, the passage of the Disaster Risk Reduction 
and Management (DRRM) Law in 2010 was due to the 
mobilisation of grass-roots support from below (Scriven, 
no date). In addition, DRRM Network was able to find 
reform champions in both the executive and legislative 
branches, who all played important roles in passing the 
legislation (Scriven 2013; Agsaoay-Sano 2010).  
1.3.1 Bibingka strategy  
In sum, the existing studies suggest that reforms are 
likely to occur if there is adequate demand from below, 
as well as sufficient opening from above. The former 
refers to autonomous social movements clamouring 
either for substantive policy changes or better policy 
implementation. The latter, on the other hand, comes 
from state officials who seek to enhance service 
delivery or curb government inefficiency.  
With sufficient demand from below and with adequate 
opening from above, state and societal actors are able 
to interact with one another, which then pushes the 
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reform agenda forward. Such an approach is often 
described as the ‘bibingka strategy’ – a term that was 
coined by Borras to refer to the mutually reinforcing 
reform measures undertaken by government leaders 
from above and the radical actions by autonomous 
peasant movements from below.  
First used in the study of agrarian reform, this 
framework suggests that “the symbiotic interaction 
between autonomous societal groups from below 
and strategically placed state reformists from above 
provides the most promising strategy to offset strong 
landlord resistance to land reform” (Borras 1998: 125). 
It further points out that the successful implementation 
of land reform involves the “symbiotic interaction 
between autonomous societal groups from below and 
state reformists from above” (Ibid.: 134).  
As Borras explains in his pioneering book The Bibingka 
Strategy in Land Reform Implementation:  
“The outcomes of the land reform policy are not 
determined by either structural or institutional 
factors alone, or by the actions of state elites alone, 
but the political actions and strategies of a wide 
range of state and societal actors also bear on the 
outcomes of the reform process” (Ibid.: 125).
However, this does not erase any potential and actual 
differences – and even clashing interests – between 
the various actors from ‘above’ and ‘below’, thereby 
ensuring a terrain that is marked by dynamics, 
engagement and discourse. 
Eventually, the bibingka strategy became so influential 
that it is now often used to explain the “partial but 
significant successes in land reform” (Borras and 
Franco 2010: 70). Though redistributive efforts in 
the Philippines are often marred by “a lukewarm state 
response and government inertia” (Ibid.: 69), this has 
often been overcome by “the peculiar nature of state–
society interactions around national policy-making and 
implementation during this period” (Ibid.: 70).  
To prove this point, Borras and Franco (2010) cite data 
from the Department of Agrarian Reform, which states 
that by 2007, 6 million hectares of land (both public 
and private) had already been redistributed to 3 million 
rural poor households – a number that represented 
approximately two-fifths of the agricultural population. 
In addition, 1.5 million hectares of land had been 
subjected to leasehold, benefitting more than 1 million 
tenant households.  
Without a doubt, the bibingka strategy has been the 
most significant development in the reform discourse in 
the Philippines. Nonetheless, in spite of its importance, 
the framework also has its limitations, because it does 
not fully capture the reform dynamic at every level 
of engagement. While it can in principle account for 
state–society interactions at both the national and 
sub-national levels, the framework has not explicitly 
addressed this issue of scale, and the interaction 
between advocacy efforts at multiple levels. In most 
instances, very little detailed explanation is offered 
regarding the interrelationship of these different levels 
with each other.  
As a consequence, the bibingka strategy is often only 
able to offer general explanations on how reform takes 
place. It is unable to adequately discuss context, how 
certain factors converge at a given point in a particular 
time to produce reform or the different actions taken 
at different levels by various actors. While it can offer 
generally broad explanations on how reforms take 
place, such knowledge has yet to be unbundled in order 
to fully comprehend the complex political dynamics at 
every level of engagement.  
1.3.2 Vertical integration  
The analytical gaps identified above can be addressed 
by adopting the concept of ‘vertical integration’, which 
can potentially provide an adequate description of 
the reform dynamics at every level of engagement. A 
more detailed discussion on vertical integration will 
be provided by Jonathan Fox in the next chapter. But 
in sum, this refers to the “systematic coordination 
of policy monitoring and advocacy between diverse 
levels of civil society, from local to state, national, and 
international arenas” (Fox 2001: 617).  
Meant as a strategy for civil society engagement in 
scrutinising government performance in order to 
influence it, Fox argues that “the vertical integration 
of policy analysis articulates processes of monitoring, 
evaluation, and analysis of all levels of official 
decision making at the same time, permitting civil 
society advocacy actors to develop strategies in real 
time rather than after the fact” (Ibid.: 621). For this 
reason, vertically integrated initiatives can deliver 
more lasting and substantive governance reforms, 
since “systematic, coordinated monitoring of the 
performance of all levels of public decision making 
can reveal more clearly where the main problems 
are, permitting more precisely targeted civil society 
advocacy strategies” (Ibid.: 624).  
Vertical integration is both a strategy and an analytical 
framework that unpacks campaigns to see their 
strengths and limitations through the lens of scale. 
As an analytical framework, vertical integration aims 
to uncover the complexities of the reform process by 
focusing on coordinated, multi-level and multi-actor 
reform initiatives that employ a variety of strategies 
to achieve success. Vertical integration captures the 
following:  
• the combination of actors and actions at a given level; 
• the intensity of the use of different kinds of action at 
each level; and 
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• the extent of civil society use of different actions / 
strategies at each level.  
Such dimensions are important since they are able 
to highlight the specific context and dynamics of a 
particular reform initiative, i.e. the prevailing politico-
economic condition, the existing power structure, and 
the established governance institutions per level. These 
factors, in turn, are likely to affect: 
• state–society relationships (or how society makes 
use of the mechanisms of the government and how 
the state, in turn, reacts to societal forces); 
• society–society relationships (or how societal actors 
interact with one another).  
By properly understanding the scale and context of an 
initiative, we are able to provide a solid analytical frame 
that could capture the varied factors of the reform 
process. It could also yield better insights for future 
strategies and actions, which in turn increases the 
likelihood of success. Under this approach, the various 
actions that citizens and their organisations and 
movements employ at different levels can be broadly 
categorised, as shown in the matrix in Table 1. Mapping 
which actions, if any, are taken by the initiative at each 
level of decision-making shows the interlinkages of the 
actions and the scale of the initiative. 
Interfacing with the state, on the other hand, 
involves approaches that range from collaborative 
to adversarial, as shown in the matrix in Table 2. The 
actions include policy advocacy with the executive and 
legislative bodies; legal actions; participation in ‘invited 
spaces’ and in ‘claimed spaces’ (Gaventa 2006); public 
protest; and engagement with public accountability 
agencies.  
By applying vertical integration as a lens through which 
to analyse the ways in which issue advocacy campaigns 
operate on multiple levels, we can better understand 
the seven cases featured in this paper, since these 
are all coordinated, multi-level and multi-actor reform 
initiatives that employ a variety of strategies to gain 
concrete results. It could also help us answer how 
substantive reforms are actually achieved in the 
Philippines, as well as draw lessons and insights to 
inform future actions.  
Vertical integration, therefore, is a potentially useful 
tool for both researchers and practitioners. In the 
hands of the former, it can be used as an analytical 
framework to explain the relationship and dynamics of 
the various reform actors at every level of engagement; 
while the latter can utilise it as a guide for improving 
policy and for pushing for more strategic reforms 
to improve policy formulation, implementation or 
evaluation.  
1.4 Overview of the report 
Following this introduction, this report continues with 
a framing chapter by Jonathan Fox, who popularised 
the term ‘vertical integration’. This is followed by a brief 
chapter contextualising the use of vertical integration 
in the history of civil society in the Philippines. The 
subsequent chapter brings together summaries of the 
case study findings. The final chapter synthesises the 
findings and discusses the common features observed 
/ documented in the case studies that flesh out the 
empirical details behind the propositions put forward 
by vertical integration.  
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Table 1 Scaling accountability mapping matrix: constituency-building
CONSTITUENCY-
BUILDING
LEVEL OF ACTION
Constituency-
building 
approaches:
Very local 
(community / 
school)
District /
municipality
State /
province
National International
Grass-roots 
organising / 
awareness-building
Coalition-building 
among already 
organised, shared 
constituency
Cross-sectoral 
coalition-building
Mass collective 
action / protest
Public education 
strategy 
Independent CSO 
monitoring of policy 
implementation
Horizontal exchange 
of experiences / 
deliberation 
Participatory 
process to develop 
CSO policy 
alternative
Strategic use of ICT 
for constituency-
building
12
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Table 2 Scaling accountability mapping matrix: interface with the state
INTERFACE WITH  
THE STATE
LEVEL OF ACTION
CSO interfaces with 
the state:
Very local 
(community, 
village, 
neighbourhood)
District /
municipality
State /
province
National International
Policy advocacy – 
executive authorities 
(mayor, governor, 
etc.) 
Policy advocacy – 
legislature (town 
council, state 
legislature, 
parliament) 
Legal recourse  
(case-based or 
strategic)
Participation in 
‘invited spaces’ 
(shared but 
government-
controlled)
Participation in 
‘claimed spaces’ 
(shared with 
government, created 
in response to CSO 
initiative)
Engagement with 
public accountability 
agencies 
(ombudsman, audit 
bureaus, human 
rights commissions)
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2. Doing accountability differently: 
Vertically integrated civil society 
policy monitoring and advocacy
Jonathan Fox1  
2.1 Introduction
Civil society initiatives in the field of transparency, 
participation and accountability (TPA) are flourishing 
in the global South, yet governmental responsiveness 
often falls short of expectations.2 This limited impact 
suggests the need to rethink reformers’ strategies 
and tactics. How can institutional change initiatives 
focus more directly on the causes, rather than just 
the symptoms, of accountability failures? To help 
civil society organisations (CSOs) and their allies in 
government to get more traction on the uphill climb 
towards accountability, this chapter makes the case for 
a more systemic approach: the vertical integration of 
civil society policy monitoring and advocacy. 
Recent reviews of the evidence of accountability 
outcomes underscore the problem. A now-classic 
review of transparency and accountability initiatives 
found that transparency had very uneven and modest 
impacts on accountability (McGee and Gaventa 2010). 
A more recent meta-analysis of social accountability 
initiatives finds that many of them are too superficial 
and limited in scope to actually leverage accountability 
(Fox 2014). Numerous ‘civic-tech’ online platforms 
inspire hope for citizen voice to leverage better public 
service provision, but so far, few have tangibly improved 
service delivery (Peixoto and Fox 2016; Edwards and 
McGee 2016). In the global arena, a recent review of the 
evidence from international multi-stakeholder initiatives 
to promote open government (e.g. Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, Open Government Partnership) 
finds that while they often manage to encourage 
more information disclosure, they have yet to reach 
accountability gains (Brockmyer and Fox 2015).3
These TPA efforts differ in terms of whether their 
main focus is local, national or international, but they 
share the assumption that ‘information is power’. 
This assumption turns out to be overly optimistic. 
Research on the track records of these TPA initiatives 
suggests a disconnect: information access and citizen 
voice are often not enough to deliver accountability 
(Halloran 2015; Joshi 2014; Fox 2007a). Indeed, 
transparency and accountability initiatives are often 
not well articulated with other anti-corruption, 
democratisation and citizen participation efforts that 
one might expect would all be coordinated and moving 
in the same direction (Carothers and Brechenmacher 
2014). Looking across the TPA field, one finds 
more fragmentation than synergy, and the whole is 
sometimes less than the sum of the parts.4 This raises 
the question: how can transparency and accountability 
initiatives get more traction? This chapter discusses 
one CSO strategy that tries to take entrenched 
institutional obstacles more fully into account by 
‘doing accountability differently’: vertical integration of 
coordinated CSO policy monitoring and advocacy.5
The point of departure here is that if the causes of 
accountability failures are systemic, then strategies 
that seek systemic change are needed (see Box 1). 
A growing body of academic research on the 
drivers of the institutional changes that address 
the causes of corruption and impunity suggest 
that they require mutually reinforcing changes in 
both state and society. Scholars point to: ‘deep 
democratization’ (Johnston 2014); a ‘big bang’ 
approach involving multiple, mutually reinforcing 
policy reforms that overcome collective action 
problems (Marquette and Peiffer 2015; Persson, 
Rothstein and Teorell 2013; Rothstein 2011); 
inherently uneven ‘transitions to accountability’ 
led by state–society coalitions (Fox 2007b); 
and ‘transitions to good governance’ (Mungia-
Pippidi 2015). In spite of their diversity, these 
explanations of lasting institutional change share 
an emphasis on nationwide, cumulative power 
shifts, as well as on windows of opportunity that 
are notoriously difficult to predict and hard for 
external allies to promote. This poses a challenge: 
how can pro-accountability strategists address 
the need for deep power shifts when windows of 
opportunity are not open, and dramatic ‘big bang’ 
shifts do not seem to be on the agenda – in other 
words, most of the time?
Box 1. Recent explanations of 
systemic change question 
incremental accountability 
initiatives
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After all, anti-accountability forces, with their strong 
vested interests in opposing change, are often quite 
effective at isolating, neutering and rolling back 
incremental pro-accountability action initiatives or 
institutional enclaves.6 This suggests that building 
effective accountability systems requires strategies 
that take ‘anti-accountability systems’ into account 
(Halloran 2015, 2014; Fox 2007b). This chapter 
draws on both practitioner and scholarly literatures 
to explore both the rationale and dynamics involved 
in one response to such challenges: multi-level CSO 
monitoring and advocacy strategies.  
2.1.1 Defining terms 1: From scaling up to 
‘connecting the dots’
Insofar as the TPA field has relied on overly optimistic 
assumptions about the power of information, a 
conceptual reboot seems to be in order. One missing 
link involves the challenge of how to ‘take scale into 
account’. In international development discussions, 
scale is usually understood as a reference to size: 
more or bigger – as in ‘scaling up’. Here, scale 
will be understood differently. ‘Taking scale into 
account’ refers to articulating how different levels of 
development decision-making interact with each other 
(from the local level to district, provincial, national and 
transnational arenas) – both for the public sector and 
for civil society.7
Conventional approaches to social accountability and 
transparency do not take a multi-level approach. On the 
one hand, most social accountability initiatives (such 
as community scorecards) are locally bounded, while 
on the other hand, most open government initiatives 
rely on national agencies to disclose official budget or 
activity data, which is rarely disaggregated in citizen-
friendly or actionable ways. These initiatives are often 
limited by their approach to scale: local interventions 
remain localised, rarely spreading horizontally or 
extending their leverage vertically by influencing 
higher-level authorities, while national initiatives based 
in capital cities risk circulating primarily among those 
already convinced – or remaining limited to cyberspace, 
delinked from offline civic action. In contrast, vertically 
integrated accountability initiatives ‘take scale into 
account’ by linking citizen action at the grass roots with 
action at the national level, while seeking to broaden 
their ‘coverage’ horizontally in terms of geographic 
and social inclusion of excluded citizens. Multi-level 
citizen oversight initiatives can gain additional traction 
if the evidence they produce manages to trigger public 
checks-and-balances institutions, such as legislative 
oversight committees, audit bureaus, ombuds agencies, 
human rights commissions, consumer protection 
agencies or public prosecutors.  
This approach to ‘scaling accountability’ goes beyond 
‘scaling up’, a concept that is usually understood as 
replication (doing more of a particular activity). When 
a pilot, often localised activity ‘works’, then replication 
is certainly called for; yet replication may not be 
enough to address the underlying systemic causes 
of accountability failures. How to do that depends on 
the particular national context, but the more general 
point is that it makes more sense to focus on how to 
get more impact than on seeking scale (growth) per se 
– as when developing more numerous but still strictly 
localised actions (Guerzovich and Poli 2014).  
For example, if a social accountability initiative 
involves community interface meetings between health 
clinic workers and communities, then scaling up as 
replication would mean convening them at more clinics 
(e.g. from 10 to 50 to 500 villages). Yet the underlying 
causes of medicine stock-outs or abusive staff may 
lie far ‘upstream’. If civil society oversight efforts to 
address these problems were to ‘do accountability 
differently’, and make connections across levels, they 
would bring together democratic representatives from 
those 10, 50 or 500 grass-roots communities. Such 
meetings could ground a strategy to build a broad-
based civic or social process that would have not only 
significant evidence-generating capacity, but also the 
civic clout needed to persuade policy-makers to act 
on those findings – especially regarding problems in 
the health system that are caused by factors located 
beyond their respective clinics.  
‘Taking scale into account’ requires investing in the 
capacity to do independent citizen monitoring at 
multiple levels, allowing public oversight of the links 
in the official decision-making chain that are not 
visible from the community level. To sum up, ‘doing 
accountability differently’ involves ‘connecting the 
dots’ to produce sustainable institutional change 
by generating credible and actionable independent 
evidence, targeting citizen action and leveraging power 
shifts at multiple levels (Fox and Halloran 2016).  
This is the context for the proposition of ‘vertical 
integration’ of civil society policy monitoring and 
advocacy, a strategy that tries to address power 
imbalances by emphasising the coordinated 
independent oversight of public sector actors at local, 
subnational, national and transnational levels. The goal 
is for the whole to be greater than the sum of the parts. 
The core rationale for trying to monitor each stage and 
level of public sector decision-making, non-decision-
making and performance is to reveal more precisely not 
only where the main causes of accountability failures 
are located, but also their interconnected nature. This 
focus on understanding as many links in the chain of 
public sector decisions as possible is relevant both 
to inform possible solutions and to empower the 
coalitions needed to promote them. By attempting 
to ‘take scale into account’, vertical integration puts 
coalition-building between social and civic actors with 
different, complementary strengths at the centre of the 
17
RESEARCH REPORT Going vertical: citizen-led reform campaigns in the Philippines
strategy – for example, infomediaries plus membership-
based civic organisations and alternative media.  
If government reformists are also willing to invest their 
political capital in insider–outsider coalitions, so much 
the better.8 Where those committed to good governance 
both inside and outside the state manage to forge 
balanced partnerships, that creates the possibility 
for each set of actors to strengthen the other. The 
dynamic process of change in which outsider pressure 
strengthens insiders, while insider willingness and 
capacity delivers tangible reform progress, can drive a 
‘virtuous circle’ of mutual empowerment. This process 
is called ‘state–society synergy’ (see Box 2). This 
framework informs the idea of the ‘sandwich strategy’, 
which combines pressure from above and below to 
isolate and weaken anti-accountability forces embedded 
in the state (Fox 2014, 1992). In the Philippines, the 
sandwich strategy was applied as the bibingka strategy, 
the broad-based advocacy campaign that led to the 
substantial (and unexpected) progress achieved with 
land reform implementation in the mid-1990s (Borras 
2001, 1998). Recent conversations in the Philippines 
suggest, however, that more recently, at least in some 
circles, the term ‘bibingka strategy’ is now used to refer 
to collaborative government–CSO partnerships more 
generally. This watered-down use of the term loses 
the analytical and civic ‘edge’ that was central to the 
original version, where autonomous mass organisations 
of stakeholders energised implementation by carrying 
out protests to target governmental bottlenecks that 
blocked the agrarian reform law.  
This chapter spells out the rationale for vertical 
integration with five propositions that address major 
challenges faced by CSOs working to build public 
accountability. Note: the term ‘policy’ is used here as a 
broad umbrella category, referring to the full array of 
governmental decisions and non-decisions that shape 
public sector performance, including... agenda-setting, 
policy formulation and implementation.  
The empirical examples cited here are illustrations 
of ‘proof of concept’ rather than claims of definitive 
evidence.9 Indeed, even though practical experiences 
with ‘partial vertical integration’ of monitoring and 
advocacy are common, there is little robust empirical 
research on the trajectories and impacts of multi-level 
work because research agendas in the TPA field have 
yet to address the strategy. That is why this report’s 
case studies of CSO-led independent monitoring and 
advocacy make such an important contribution to 
the national and international discussion of how TPA 
initiatives can get more traction. 
2.1.2 Defining terms 2: Unpacking vertical 
integration 
This reframed meaning of scale sets the stage for 
the proposition of ‘vertical integration’ of civil society 
policy monitoring and advocacy. This approach tries 
to address power imbalances by emphasising the 
coordinated independent oversight of public sector 
actors at local, subnational, national and transnational 
levels. The goal is for the whole to be greater than the 
sum of the parts. The core rationale for monitoring 
each stage and level of public sector decision-making, 
non-decision-making and performance is to reveal 
more precisely not only where the main causes of 
accountability failures are located, but also their 
interconnected nature. This focus on understanding as 
many links in the chain of public sector decisions as 
possible is relevant, both to inform possible solutions 
and to empower the coalitions needed to promote 
them.  
Vertical integration puts coalition-building 
between social and civic actors with different but 
complementary strengths at the centre of the strategy 
(e.g. CSO policy analysts plus membership-based civic 
organisations to do bottom-up oversight and advocacy, 
plus independent media to disseminate both the 
findings and the citizen action).  
The metaphor of vertical integration draws from 
political economy, where the term refers to an 
enterprise’s control of its own supply chain, including 
both backward linkages (inputs, parts) and forward 
linkages (distribution, sales and repair). In contrast 
to the business context, where ‘integration’ refers to 
centralised control, in the civil society realm the term 
points much more loosely towards the coordination of 
independent monitoring and advocacy capacity across 
as much as possible of the governance process – from 
policy debate and agenda-setting to the formulation 
of policy and budget decisions, as well as to their 
implementation throughout different agencies and 
levels of government. Figure 1 illustrates this process 
of CSO oversight, with independent watchdog capacity 
of some kind at each level, parallel to the vertical 
structures of governance. In practice, ‘full’ vertical 
integration of independent policy monitoring and 
advocacy is rare, since it involves a relatively high 
degree of institutional capacity as well as many ‘moving 
parts’. Yet, as will be discussed, even ‘partial’ degrees 
of vertical integration (e.g. from local to district or 
provincial levels, or from national to departmental 
levels) can generate more comprehensive and therefore 
stronger civil society oversight efforts.  
2.1.3 Defining terms 3: Policy monitoring 
and advocacy  
CSO oversight is understood here as potentially 
including both monitoring and advocacy, though a 
preliminary scoping of the civil society landscape 
suggests that in practice few CSOs do both. Indeed, 
diverse types of organisation are likely to play very 
different roles in this process, as will be discussed in 
the context of coalition-building. Policy monitoring is 
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> State–society synergy
> Accountability politics 
> Transitions to accountability   
State–society synergy 
How can the seeds of accountability grow in spite of 
public institutions marked by entrenched corruption 
and systemic impunity? Embedding accountability 
into the state is an inherently uneven, partial and 
contested process. ‘State–society synergy’ offers a 
relevant conceptual framework. This approach tries 
to identify the dynamics and impacts of the mutual 
empowerment of actors in state and society. In this 
view, the construction of public accountability is 
driven by cycles of mutually reinforcing interaction 
between the thickening of civil society and state 
reformist initiatives. Though this kind of state–society 
synergy is the exception rather than the rule in most 
countries, the exceptions matter. Past struggles can 
leave cracks in the system that serve as handholds 
for subsequent campaigns seeking to open it up 
to greater public scrutiny. These processes tend to 
unfold outside the realm of national elections and 
political parties.  
In the state–society synergy framework for 
understanding how public institutions change, 
the main cleavage is not between the ostensibly 
dichotomous and implicitly monolithic state versus 
society, but rather between contending pro- versus 
anti-accountability forces that are each embedded 
in both state and society. Anti-accountability forces 
often manage to sustain mutually empowering 
coalitions that cross the state–society divide, 
perpetuating ‘low accountability traps’ that keeps 
them strong and pro-accountability forces weak. As 
a result, pro-accountability actors both in state and 
society face the challenge of finding strategies for 
their own mutual empowerment that will allow them 
to isolate and weaken anti-accountability forces.  
Accountability politics 
This approach focuses on processes of accountability 
politics, defined as the conflicts and coalitions that 
determine whether and how public and private 
sector elites are held publicly responsible for their 
decisions. Accountability politics involves challenging 
who is accountable to whom, as clients become 
citizens, politicians become representatives and 
bureaucrats become public servants. Accountability 
politics can overlap with pro-democracy movements, 
but are not limited to them. Accountability 
campaigns involve protest against powerful 
elites, but also involve partnerships with insiders 
willing to invest their political capital to support 
institutional change. As a result, constructing public 
accountability involves challenging the state, but also 
transforms the state. Accountability politics is not 
the same as political accountability; it is related to 
but distinct from electoral competition, both logically 
and empirically.  
Transitions to accountability 
Back in the 1980s, as authoritarian regimes 
fell around the world, transitions to democracy 
were widely expected to drive transitions to 
accountability. Clearly, however, competitive 
electoral politics has not managed to end systemic 
corruption, abuse and impunity. This unsettled 
combination of continuity and change underscores 
the relevance of the conceptual distinction between 
the political regime – that is, the set of public 
institutions that determine who governs – and the 
state – that is, the public institutions that govern 
society and the economy in between elections. Most 
of the political science literature on democratic 
transitions and governance focuses on electoral 
and elected institutions, but public concerns about 
accountable governance are as much about states 
as they are about regimes. 
Where electoral democracy produces highly uneven 
and inconsistent degrees of accountable governance, 
then it may be useful to think in terms of ‘transitions 
to accountability’. Such transformations of the state 
are analogous to, but distinct from, transitions to 
democratic regimes. Among scholars, the study of 
‘transitions to accountability’ is today where the 
analysis of transitions to electoral democracy was 
back in the late 1970s or early 1980s – still lacking 
comprehensive explanatory frameworks. Scholars 
still lack analytical frameworks that can explain 
how accountable governance becomes stronger, 
or how it spreads from enclaves across entire 
state apparatuses, or how accountability expands 
vertically, from the local to the national or vice versa. 
Perhaps more scholarly attention to accountability 
politics can inform the development of more relevant 
analytical frameworks. 
Box 2. Three concepts for discussion10
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also defined broadly here, including classic ‘follow the 
money’ efforts that seek to identify leakages, rights-
based approaches that document patterns of bias, as 
well as independent assessments of the performance 
of public sector agencies. Public interest advocacy 
refers then to a spectrum of possible efforts to influence 
the policy process in favour of the public interest, 
ranging from agenda-setting to policy-making and 
implementation. By this definition, advocacy can include 
a broad menu of possible citizen actions, ranging from 
the local to the global and from the more collaborative 
to the more adversarial (as outlined in the mapping tool 
applied in Joy Aceron’s chapter).  
Monitoring and advocacy may have the potential to 
reinforce each other, as suggested in Figure 1, but it 
turns out that they involve quite different repertoires 
of action. In national capitals, independent policy 
analysts and thinktanks that dedicate themselves to 
extracting, processing and disseminating government 
data – sometimes called infomediaries – are very 
well positioned to reveal the government’s priorities 
by monitoring the legislature or analysing the 
budget. Partnerships with broad-based membership 
organisations, with their thousands of eyes and ears 
on the ground, make it possible to monitor actual 
government performance and to encourage citizen 
voice and action. The potential complementarity 
between technically skilled CSOs and large social or 
civic organisations puts the challenge of building and 
sustaining cross-sectoral, multi-level coalitions at the 
centre of the practice of vertical integration. In the 
context of such often-delicate processes of building 
coalitions among very different kinds of organisations 
(which underscores the need for balanced power-
sharing and transparent decision-making), the term 
‘integration’ can be interpreted as implying an undue 
degree of centralisation. The rationale for using the 
term, however, is to emphasise the goal of creating 
synergy, which would be produced by coordination 
among multiple CSOs – both playing different roles and 
working across levels – for reasons discussed below 
(see also Figure 1).11 
 
2.2 Vertical integration is easier 
said than done: five propositions 
for discussion
The different kinds of coordination proposed here – 
between very different kinds of actors, across levels, 
and bridging monitoring and advocacy – address 
at least five distinct challenges, framed here as 
propositions for discussion:  
1. Vertical integration can deal with the problem of 
‘squeezing the balloon’ 
2. Locally bounded citizen voice and oversight misses 
upstream governance problems 
Figure 1. Seeking synergy: multi-level independent policy monitoring and advocacy
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3. Even ‘partial’ vertical integration can bolster citizen 
voice and leverage 
4. CSO coalitions can increase leverage by finding 
synergy between policy monitoring and advocacy 
5. Broad-based CSO monitoring and advocacy 
coalitions can bring together policy analysis, civic 
muscle, territorial reach and under-represented 
voices.  
The following discussion of each of these propositions 
combines analysis of how multi-level approaches 
can contribute to pro-accountability leverage with a 
consideration of the difficulties involved. 
2.2.1 Vertical integration can take on the 
problem of ‘squeezing the balloon’  
The expression ‘squeezing the balloon’ conveys the 
way in which authorities and vested interests may 
resist independent oversight efforts by either deflecting 
or eluding reform efforts (2014, 2001). Deflection is 
when officials point the finger elsewhere in response 
to CSO monitoring and advocacy efforts, claiming that 
the actions in question were really decided somewhere 
else, in a different agency or at a different level of 
government. For example, municipal authorities may 
claim that a problem lies with the provincial or district 
government. Those subnational authorities may point 
the finger either back downwards to the local level, 
or upwards to the national level. National officials, 
in turn, may claim that the problem resides at the 
subnational level – or they may point the finger at 
international actors (as in “the World Bank made us do 
it”). International actors, in turn, are quite capable of 
eliding their responsibility by shifting blame to national 
or subnational governments.  
Governance processes often involve many different 
public sector actors. This raises what political scientists 
call ‘the problem of many hands’ (Thompson 1980), 
which refers to institutional decisions that involve 
many parties, which makes it difficult to hold any one 
single actor responsible for misdeeds. Yet even where 
many hands are indeed involved, some decision-
makers are usually more responsible than others in any 
specific case of accountability failure; the challenge 
for pro-accountability actors is to open the black box 
of the state to figure out who did what, and why (e.g. 
Grandvoinnet, Aslam and Raha. 2015).  
The second challenge of the ‘squeezing the balloon’ 
problem emerges when the targets of citizen oversight 
adapt by modifying their corruption practices. The 
corrupt are flexible, and they are quite capable of 
shifting their efforts to where opportunities are greatest 
and oversight is weakest. As funding flows through long 
chains of official decision-making, and public scrutiny 
is only able to shed the spotlight on one or two of those 
stages, then ‘leakage’ is likely to shift to those decision-
making processes that remain in the dark. For example, 
in some large, government-sponsored rural community 
development programmes that include citizen oversight 
mechanisms (like India’s social audits or Indonesia’s 
Kecamatan Development Program), it seems that 
corrupt officials have responded by inventing new and 
less visible ways to divert funds, shifting from wage 
theft to the manipulation of billing practices (see for 
example, Shankar 2010; Olken 2009). In other words, 
the ‘squeezing the balloon’ phenomenon means that 
programme monitoring that is exclusively local in 
scope may well manage to change the ‘shape’ of the 
‘corruption market’, but not necessarily the volume of 
corruption (Zimmerman 2015).12
In response to this problem, the core rationale for 
trying to monitor each stage and level of public 
sector decision-making, non-decision-making and 
performance is to reveal more precisely not only where 
the main causes of accountability failures are located, 
but also their interconnected nature. The proposition 
here is that CSO oversight of as many links in the chain 
of public sector decisions as possible is relevant both 
to inform the design of possible policy reforms and 
to empower the coalitions needed to promote them – 
including bolstering the government’s own checks-and-
balances oversight institutions. 
2.2.2 Locally bounded citizen voice and 
oversight misses upstream governance 
problems 
The World Bank’s 2004 World Development Report 
emphasised that citizen voice and oversight could 
contribute to improving public service delivery. 
This unprecedented official legitimation not only 
encouraged what the World Bank would call 
its own ‘demand-side’ approaches to promote 
good governance, it also emboldened very large, 
international service delivery non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) to venture into the terrain 
of citizen engagement (e.g. CARE, World Vision, 
Save the Children). These NGOs followed the 
‘constructive engagement’ approach, drawing on 
pre-existing partnerships with governments to create 
bounded spaces for local citizen voice. ‘Constructive 
engagement’ designates collaborative CSO–
government relationships that avoid confrontation, 
or even public criticism, and can be applied in any 
arena, from local to global (see Box 5). Most often 
these ‘invited spaces’ for citizen voice have been 
strictly locally focused, though the Philippines case 
that is discussed below shows how a constructive 
engagement approach can be applied to a multi-
level policy monitoring initiative that connected 
local oversight with national level CSO–government 
dialogue. 
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The WDR’s explicit legitimation of citizen voice as a 
constructive input to the governance of service delivery 
opened up modest, incremental yet unprecedented 
space in some relatively closed societies.14 Yet its 
influential conceptual framework circumscribed the 
acceptable role of citizen voice exclusively to the local 
arena and limited the targets of legitimate public 
oversight to frontline service providers, which some 
refer to as the ‘last mile’.15 Indeed, in some cases the 
combination of community access to information about 
service provision, and the creation of safe spaces for 
citizen voice, has been shown to make a dramatic 
difference in local service delivery performance (e.g. 
Bjorkman and Svennson 2009). Still, such high-impact 
outcomes have been both rare and difficult to replicate. 
After all, when clinics suffer from stock-outs,  this may 
be because medicines were diverted further up in the 
health ministry’s chain of command or because they 
were undersupplied after senior health ministry officials 
overpaid corrupt providers in exchange for kickbacks 
(e.g. Vian 2008). When health-care workers demand 
informal payments from patients, the cause may be 
located upstream because they had to pay to get their 
job or are required to pass money from patients up 
the chain of authorities (Schaaf and Freedman 2015). 
Similarly, schools may suffer from absent teachers not 
because of their individual issues, but rather because 
of more systemic reasons. If teachers are absent from 
the classroom because they bought their government 
jobs, or because they are busy working full-time for a 
political party, then the key accountability failures are 
located upstream, where decisions about hiring and 
firing are made – far from the reach of school-level 
parent committees (Altschuler 2013).16
Vertical integration, as a multi-level strategy 
combining independent monitoring and advocacy, 
emerged from a decade of independent CSO 
monitoring of World Bank-funded rural development 
projects in Mexico, grounded in coalitions 
between a CSO and autonomous regional peasant 
and indigenous organisations. Led by the CSO 
Trasparencia13 (1995–2005), the goal was to 
monitor each project decision-making actor at local, 
state, national and international levels to identify 
possible gaps in the application of the development 
bank’s own social and environmental safeguard 
policies. The focus was on its public information 
access, indigenous peoples and environmental 
policies, which at that time were stronger than the 
Mexican Government’s policies. To learn about the 
strengths and limitations of these safeguard policies, 
Trasparencia partnered with the international CSO 
campaign that was advocating for the World Bank 
to comply with its commitment to what are now 
called ‘safeguard policies’. Because each World 
Bank-funded project involved multiple states and 
localities, broad geographic coverage was necessary 
to produce credible evidence, as well as to anticipate 
official responses that possible problems were 
merely anecdotal exceptions. 
Trasparencia’s strategy was to partner with region-
wide, community-based autonomous indigenous 
organisations, especially in Oaxaca and the 
Huastecas region, to advocate for their right to 
informed participation in rural development projects. 
Project resources were supposed to be allocated 
through participatory regional councils. Though 
these councils were dominated by membership 
organisations that were subordinate to the 
government, they sometimes created an opportunity 
for more autonomous organisations to seek a seat 
at the table. In the process, World Bank officials 
would point to the national government, which 
in turn would in turn shift responsibility to state 
government officials, leading to a continuous shifting 
of responsibility back and forth. This challenge 
led Trasparencia to pursue a vertically integrated 
approach, in order to determine where specific policy 
and resource-allocation decisions were actually being 
made. For a decade, this CSO coalition monitored the 
projects both from the top down and from the bottom 
up, including local and state governments, and both 
the line ministries and Treasury Departments at the 
national level (since the Treasury controlled the 
government’s relationship with the World Bank), as 
well as the World Bank itself. The team monitored 
six World Bank projects in depth, and found that in 
practice only one of them consistently applied the 
ostensibly mandatory safeguard policies (though 
another project applied them partially in some 
regions).
The principal impact of this World Bank project-
monitoring initiative was to increase the civic space 
for relatively autonomous indigenous organisations 
in some regions to engage with the government and 
to participate in resource-allocation decisions (Fox 
and Gershman 2000). In response to these efforts 
for citizen participation in programme decision-
making, the government decided to eliminate 
the regional councils and shift the ostensibly 
participatory process down to the municipal level, 
where the more autonomous regional organisations 
would have less clout (Fox 2007b). In retrospect, the 
‘squeezing the balloon’ dynamic predominated.
Box 3. Mexican CSO monitoring inspires vertical integration concept
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After more than a decade of donor investment in 
social accountability and open government initiatives, 
discussion of multi-level citizen oversight remains rare 
(see Garza 2013 for an exception). In retrospect, it 
appears that the 2004 WDR’s exclusive focus on local 
voice led many influential stakeholders to expect that 
they could achieve tangible, sustained service delivery 
improvements without investing in the bolstered 
civil society capacity-building needed to challenge 
upstream vested interests. Yet so far there is little 
evidence that top-down, external supported, locally 
bounded citizen voice initiatives trigger replication 
beyond the area of influence and the period of 
international funding (e.g. Gutman and Bhargarva 
2015). This underscores the need to rethink how 
to ‘do accountability differently’. This leads to the 
proposition that independent multi-level oversight 
has the potential to identify where the bottlenecks are 
concentrated, which can then inform change strategies 
that address the causes rather than just the symptoms 
of accountability failures. 
2.2.3 Even ‘partial’ vertical integration 
can bolster citizen leverage and voice
Clearly, the vertical integration of CSO oversight is 
an extremely ambitious goal and few organisations 
have the institutional capacity needed for the ‘full 
coverage’ of an entire policy process (from agenda-
setting to formulation through implementation) even 
in a narrow issue area. ‘Partially integrated’ policy 
monitoring refers then to citizen oversight of some 
but not all dimensions or levels of a public sector 
process. The proposition here is that – in spite of the 
challenge posed by ‘squeezing the balloon’ – public 
oversight of even some of the links in a chain of 
public sector decisions (or non-decisions) can make 
a significant difference, especially if the monitoring is 
articulated with problem-solving collective action that 
can also reach across scale. 
The emphasis on multi-level work proposed here was 
informed by an extensive experience with ‘partial 
integration’ of citizen oversight, limited to just two 
vertical links: from the village to the regional level, 
defined as including multiple municipalities (districts). 
This process extended very broadly to promote citizen 
oversight of an official food distribution network 
through 300 regional Community Food Councils in 
rural Mexico, with each of them representing dozens 
of villages. In 1979, long before the term ‘social 
accountability’ was in use, Mexico’s federal food 
distribution agency, Diconsa, promoted this citizen 
oversight strategy nationwide, embedding it within 
its vast network of community-managed village food 
stores in low-income rural regions. The programme 
still delivers staple foods to more than 27,000 village 
stores, which are supplied by 300 warehouses (each 
serving approximately 90 stores). The programme’s 
goal is to regulate consumer food prices by offering 
low-cost basic staples in remote rural areas that 
otherwise would lack market competition. 
The warehouse oversight councils had an anti-
corruption mission: to ensure that the food was 
actually delivered to the remote villages. Programme 
architects recognised that in the absence of 
stakeholder oversight, the risk was that warehouse 
staff would illegally divert the subsidised food to the 
same private retailers whose high prices were the 
target of the regulatory strategy. Community Food 
Council leaders also faced the challenge of fending off 
attempts to use the programme for political control, a 
persistent problem in Mexico. The councils’ approach 
to anti-corruption was primarily preventive, since they 
had little formal recourse if and when food supplies 
were diverted. 
The architects of the Diconsa social accountability 
process created multi-level ‘invited spaces’, and some 
became autonomous ‘claimed spaces’ in practice.17 
Elected village committees oversaw the management 
of the local stores, but what makes the programme 
design especially distinctive is that those committees 
were also represented on elected regional warehouse 
oversight committees: Community Food Councils. 
Their mission was to represent between 50 and more 
than 100 communities of at least 1,000 to 2,000 
people each, giving them legitimacy and potential 
clout, based on representing the interests of perhaps 
50,000 or 100,000 very low-income rural consumers. 
Reformist policy-makers in charge of the programme 
knew that if this oversight system was to work, the 
regional warehouse oversight councils had to be 
autonomous from both the bureaucracy and local 
elites, which led them to recruit hundreds of non-
partisan community organisers to create regional 
‘free spaces’ that allowed the village representatives 
to exercise freedom of association and expression.18 
This set a precedent back in the early 1980s, when 
Mexico was under an authoritarian one-party system. 
By the late 1990s, networks of food councils had 
gained sufficient national clout to roll back an attempt 
by national technocrats to dismantle the programme, 
briefly reaching ‘full’ vertical integration of policy 
oversight and advocacy.  
About one third of these regional councils managed 
to act as autonomous countervailing powers, 
according to field research carried out in 1985–1986 
and again in 2005–2006 (Fox 2007b). Moreover, 
even though the official scope of their oversight role 
was limited to the food distribution programme, the 
more autonomous food councils often generated 
spillover effects that encouraged other kinds 
of self-managed, scaled-up rural development 
initiatives (e.g. marketing cooperatives, coffee 
processing, fertiliser distribution, etc.). Yet many 
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of the agency’s key decisions were made at higher 
levels, state and national. Indeed, the regional 
oversight councils ostensibly had elected their own 
representative bodies at state and national levels, 
but it is no coincidence that agency managers 
made certain that autonomous leaders did not 
gain leverage within those higher-level ‘invited 
spaces’.19 Most of the time, the agency succeeded in 
containing the autonomous food councils’ capacity 
to combine monitoring and advocacy to the regional 
warehouses.  
The food councils’ sustainability has been a 
challenge, as we will see was the case with Textbook 
Count. For at least a decade and a half, this oversight 
programme’s lack of national-level allies – either in 
government or civil society – has taken its toll, and 
the food councils’ oversight capacity appears to have 
been significantly weakened. Indeed, this programme 
was largely invisible to potential allies, such as 
urban-based pro-accountability CSOs. Nevertheless, 
this experience suggests that the programme 
monitoring by stakeholders, even if coordinated 
across just two levels, from village to regional, can 
make a qualitative difference because it can at least 
identify and engage in collective action to plug 
leakages at those levels – as seen also in the case 
of the ForoSalud–CARE indigenous women’s health 
monitoring experience in the province of Puno, Peru 
(see Box 4).20
The conditions under which partial vertical integration 
of citizen oversight can make a difference are far 
from clear. Convincing answers would require 
extensive subnational comparative research that 
holds constant national context, focuses on a specific 
programme and selects cases on the variance in the 
level of government targeted by citizen oversight 
efforts (Snyder 2001). Yet the absence of systematic 
research on partial vertical integration should 
not be confused with a lack of participatory pro-
accountability experiences that could be subject to 
such analysis. Around the world, local grass-roots 
social and civic initiatives become visible – and can 
influence large institutions – precisely when they 
come together at regional and subnational levels, a 
process known in the scholarly literature on social 
movements as ‘scale shift’ (Tarrow 2010). 
2.2.4 CSO coalitions can increase leverage 
by finding synergy between policy 
monitoring and advocacy 
In the civil society landscape, how often is there 
strategic coordination between the documentation of 
public sector performance patterns (policy monitoring) 
and the exercise of citizen voice to influence public 
sector decisions or non-decisions (advocacy)? In 
practice, independent monitoring and advocacy 
are perhaps most often well articulated with each 
other in the context of a very specific kind of CSO 
initiative: responses to large infrastructure and 
extractive projects that threaten to impose social and 
environmental costs on constituencies that were not 
considered in the decision-making process. Frequently, 
in the absence of public, timely and independent 
assessments of the implications of such decisions, 
authorities and interested parties underestimate their 
social, environmental and economic costs, while over-
estimating the benefits – which are often concentrated 
in social sectors that are not expected to bear the 
costs (Clark, Fox and Treakle 2003; Fox and Brown 
1998). Large infrastructure and extractive projects 
are also notorious for creating huge opportunities 
for corruption. Yet outside this specific genre of large 
footprint projects, strategic coordination of CSO 
monitoring with advocacy is much less common – 
especially in the provision of much more dispersed 
public services or anti-poverty programmes.  
In Puno, Peru, indigenous women’s monitoring of 
health services to promote respect for rights and 
accountability was different from the usual locally 
bounded approach because it was coordinated 
through a regional government’s ombuds office. 
At interface meetings, they presented findings to 
district- and regional-level health administrators 
and hospital directors. Citizen monitors became 
the official ‘eyes and ears’ of the regional 
ombudsman office. Intensive oversight of clinics by 
almost 100 monitors (two to three visits a week) 
identified widespread patterns of medicine stock-
outs, facilities closed during peak demand times, 
‘informal payments’, as well as mistreatment, 
cultural bias and rejection of national health-
system rules intended to defend women’s rights. 
The initiative was led by the Civil Society Health 
Forum (ForoSalud) and CARE, with grass-roots 
and government partners. This ‘partial vertical 
integration’ of health monitoring, articulated at 
local and regional levels, achieved national policy 
impact in 2008 when advocates persuaded the 
health minister to officially recognise citizen-
monitoring committees, legitimating the ‘sandwich 
strategy’. In 2011, however, a new government 
dropped its support, in spite of quantitative and 
qualitative evaluations that consistently found 
positive results. By 2014, ForoSalud’s and CARE-
Peru’s priorities had shifted as well (Aston 2015; 
Frisancho 2015), but the grass-roots monitors and 
volunteer professionals continue their work. 
Box 4. Vertical integration in one 
province: indigenous women’s 
monitoring of health services 
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The goal of bringing independent monitoring and 
advocacy together is to find synergy between the 
evidence-generating potential of policy monitoring and 
the civic muscle that broad-based advocacy campaigns 
can bring to bear (as illustrated in Figure 1).21 Yet 
combining these approaches requires coalition-building 
strategies that take the diversity among potential 
participants into account (to be discussed further in 
Section 2.2.5). CSO policy monitoring and advocacy 
often involve groups with very different goals, skills, 
repertoires and theories of change. For example, 
advocacy goals grounded in the strongly felt needs 
of organised social constituencies may not involve 
what evaluation experts would consider ‘rigorous’ 
policy monitoring. Affected groups may conclude that 
they already have the information they need in order 
to justify their cause as well as to identify their allies 
and adversaries. After all, in the eyes of citizens who 
have long been subjected to corruption, discrimination 
or abuse, the prospect of making significant efforts 
to generate ‘objective’ data to demonstrate what 
is already obvious to them may seem like a poor 
investment of limited organisational resources. Plus, 
grass-roots advocates may not want to seem to 
reinforce official claims that the legitimacy of their 
cause depends on producing what constitutes ‘proof’ in 
the eyes of policy elites and academics.  
From a public-interest advocacy logic, independent 
policy monitoring involves significant costs and is not 
an end in itself, but rather a means to an end, such as 
exposing and naming previously invisible problems, 
reframing public debates, garnering mainstream 
media coverage, identifying ‘smoking guns’ with 
specific perpetrators, producing a ‘killer statistic’ 
with the potential to go viral, or influencing national 
and international politicians or technocrats who 
are receptive to evidence. These goals involve more 
than technical monitoring capacity, they also require 
advocacy strategies that draw on skills such as working 
with the media, coalition-building, mass citizen action, 
as well as the knowledge and relationships needed to 
identify potential insider allies.  
Coalition-building also involves managing political 
differences. While CSO policy monitoring and advocacy 
clearly vary in terms of the skill sets and organisational 
capacities involved, the two approaches may also 
be associated with different political strategies. In 
practice, policy monitoring is often associated with 
a constructive engagement approach. Yet if the 
primary goal is to improve policy implementation by 
plugging leaks and identifying performance problems 
in partnership with officials, this can discourage the 
direct questioning of the overall policy or of the key 
assumptions behind it. Such partnerships may limit 
CSO policy monitors’ independence, constraining 
them from publicly revealing the governance problems 
they encounter, and thereby leaving the questions of 
whether and how to actually address the problems to 
their governmental coalition partners (see Box 5).  
In contrast to the widely assumed dichotomy between 
CSO collaboration and contestation with the state, 
some of most innovative state–society anti-corruption 
coalitions involve both kinds of interaction. The 
‘sandwich strategy’ involves collaborative partnerships 
between social actors and some elements within the 
state, intended to create pathways to confront corrupt 
elements embedded elsewhere within the state (see 
Boxes 2 and 5). This is what happened in the Mexican 
Community Food Council approach cited, as well as 
in the thousands of officially enabled social audits in 
the Indian states of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. 
There, the government builds conflict into a sandwich 
strategy by supporting a vast process of participatory 
public oversight hearings that are designed precisely 
to create a safe, institutional public space for the 
poorest members of the community to be able to 
identify local elites who steal from their anti-poverty 
programmes (e.g. Maiorano 2014).22 In other words, 
some monitoring strategies try to combine voice with 
teeth by creating institutionalised processes to expose 
and challenge corruption (Fox 2014). These processes 
are adversarial but unfold within rule-based ‘proper 
channels’, in contrast to outsider confrontations. 
Advocacy campaigns, in contrast to monitoring, 
usually focus on changing policy formulation. Often 
those seeking systemic change do not prioritise ‘only’ 
improving the implementation of existing policy. Their 
theories of change may lead them to want to expose 
the vested interests that oppose policy reform, insofar 
as their goal is to address the causes of accountability 
failures. As a result, reform advocates often deploy 
pressure politics, with elements of confrontation 
or protest, and invest less in documenting how 
implementation works out in practice. Since 
governments and civil societies are rarely monolithic, 
there are also middle-ground scenarios in which 
reform factions within the government coordinate 
with CSOs to challenge opposing factions within the 
same government. The bibingka strategy was a clear 
example of this dynamic, in which pro-accountability 
state–society coalitions outflanked anti-accountability 
coalitions.  
In addition, the institutional geographies of monitoring 
versus advocacy processes may also be quite different, 
insofar as credible policy monitoring requires broad 
geographic coverage to document broad patterns of 
government actions, decisions and non-decisions at 
subnational, local and national levels. In contrast, 
advocacy campaigns may be able to influence the 
national government even though they are confined 
to the capital city. Legislative lobbying power, media 
access or citizens in the streets of the national capital 
may certainly be enough to change laws or policies – 
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but the persisting question is whether the behaviour of 
the state actually changes.  
In spite of these differences, monitoring and 
advocacy each have complementary strengths; each 
approach can contribute to the other. Most notably, 
independent policy monitoring can inform possible 
policy alternatives by seeking to identify the causes 
of governance problems, rather than just focusing on 
their symptoms.24 In addition, independent monitoring 
capacity can also generate the credible evidence that 
advocacy campaigns may need to reframe debates, 
to generate positive media coverage, to isolate 
adversaries and to win over allies.25
Moreover, if and when advocacy campaigns do win 
policy victories, they then need some degree of bottom-
up monitoring capacity in order to identify the degree 
to which new laws and policies are actually put into 
practice.  
This last challenge underscores the importance of the 
geographic breadth of policy monitoring coverage. For 
example, when a broad-based social constituency’s 
advocacy campaign did earn a national policy win – 
as when the Women-Headed Family Empowerment 
Program (PEKKA) in Indonesia won legal standing 
for women-headed households, or when Malawi’s 
Our Bodies, Our Lives movement won a commitment 
for the national health system to provide appropriate 
anti-retroviral medicines –  they needed broad-based, 
bottom-up monitoring capacity in order to determine 
whether and where the legal or health authorities 
throughout the country would actually respect those 
decisions (Essof and Khan 2015; Zulminarni and Miller 
2015). For such campaigns, independent monitoring 
capacity can also inform future decisions about where 
and how to target bottlenecks that may block the 
implementation of their policy wins. For these two 
public interest campaigns, first evidence-gathering 
In principle, the constructive engagement 
approach (collaborative partnerships between 
reformists in government and civil society) can 
strengthen insider reformists by providing them 
with civil society backing, as well as with eyes 
and ears on the ground. However, policy-makers 
often expect civil society partners to abstain from 
any public criticism, which in turn might reduce 
CSO leverage. After all, willingness to consider an 
exit option increases bargaining power. Indeed, 
the experience in the Philippines suggests that 
government participants in these partnerships 
often perceive short-term incentives to discourage 
their CSO partners from publicly targeting anti-
accountability forces in government, since an 
adversarial approach would carry the risk of 
political backlash against the insider reformers. 
Insider allies may also fear that CSO revelations of 
governance failures will be used against them in 
the next election (even if they are not responsible 
for the problems). At the same time, from the CSO 
point of view, if their allies lose the next election, 
that could end the chances of any insider–outsider 
coalition. 
Constructive engagement may be most relevant in 
more closed political contexts. In countries where 
there is little-to-no political space for autonomous 
civil society, subordinated alliances with more 
enlightened elements within government may 
be the only avenue open for CSOs to address 
governance failures; and the creation of modest 
‘free spaces’ for even very constrained collective 
deliberation and action may turn out to be 
significant in the longer term. 
Though constructive engagement partnerships 
are quite common, they are justified more often 
on the grounds of political pragmatism than on 
extensive empirical evidence that identifies the 
conditions under which they actually lead to lasting 
institutional change. Indeed, it would be useful 
to apply a political economy analysis to a wide 
range of cases in order to identify the interests 
and incentives that make successful state–society 
collaborative problem-solving possible.  
The term ‘constructive engagement’ itself may 
well constrain its capacity for leveraging change, 
insofar as the language conceals the full range 
of possible collaborations between reformers in 
state and society.23 The word ‘constructive’ implies 
that adversarial approaches are necessarily not 
constructive, yet insider reformists may well need 
external pressure on anti-reform forces to gain 
leverage. In other words, strategic state–society 
coalitions may actually combine CSO collaboration 
with pro-reform forces in government on the one 
hand, with conflict that is targeted to weaken the 
vested interests in government that oppose reform 
on the other. As a result, terms like ‘state–society 
coalitions for change’ and ‘critical collaboration’ 
leave room for this productive deployment of 
adversarial approaches, and therefore capture a 
more strategic theory of collaborative change than 
does the term ‘constructive engagement’.  
Box 5. Frames for collaborative reform strategies: ‘constructive 
engagement’ or ‘state–society coalitions for change’?
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informed advocacy campaigns, then advocacy wins 
informed monitoring, which in turn can inform future 
advocacy (as illustrated in Figure 1). 
This focus on geographic reach is relevant for both 
monitoring and advocacy, yet they may follow 
different paths. To return to the two cases already 
mentioned, both the Community Food Councils in 
Mexico and Textbook Count in the Philippines involved 
monitoring multiple levels of government performance 
for a specific service, but the ways in which they 
combined monitoring and advocacy differed. The more 
autonomous of the Community Food Councils reached 
from the local to the regional level. In that context, 
they used their monitoring capacity to inform advocacy 
in their efforts to improve programme performance.26 
These regional social actors were willing to tackle 
policy implementation problems head-on, from the 
warehouses to state capitals, with a wide range of 
possible tactics, including mass protest when the 
agency was unresponsive. Textbook Count, in contrast, 
carried out independent policy monitoring all the way 
from local to national levels, while its advocacy work 
was limited to the national level, where they brought 
problems identified to the attention of national policy-
makers in regular problem-solving sessions. While 
their broad-based civic allies on the ground were very 
willing to document textbook delivery and to report 
problems, they were not directly engaged in advocacy 
or problem-solving. 
Figure 2 illustrates this difference in these two 
initiatives’ degrees of vertical integration, distinguishing 
monitoring from advocacy to show that the geographic 
reach of each approach can vary independently. The 
food councils did both monitoring and advocacy, 
but mainly at regional levels, while Textbook Count 
coordinated monitoring from national to local levels, 
while doing advocacy behind the scenes, exclusively 
with national policy-maker allies (Aceron 2016). The 
question of the most appropriate level(s) for focusing 
monitoring and advocacy attention will depend on the 
structure of a given policy system, most importantly its 
degree of centralisation / decentralisation. That said, 
the proposition here suggests that in any system, to 
focus only on one level will miss some key decisions.  
This fourth proposition about the need for synergy 
between monitoring and advocacy raises the specific 
issue of how to construct and sustain coalitions 
that bring together socially and politically diverse 
constituencies, sometimes reaching across the state–
society divide in pursuit of shared goals. Sustaining 
balanced collaboration between professional CSOs and 
broad-based mass membership organisations is often 
especially challenging.
2.2.5 Broad-based CSO monitoring and 
advocacy coalitions can bring together 
policy analysis, civic muscle, territorial 
reach and under-represented voices 
Figure 2. Mapping multi-level monitoring and advocacy
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The vertical integration proposition underscores 
the potential for synergy and mutual empowerment 
between CSOs with technical policy analysis skills, 
media presence and access to policy-makers 
on the one hand, and broad-based membership 
organisations with potential civic muscle on the other. 
Yet there are good reasons why such partnerships 
are actually rather rare. Relationships between NGOs 
and social organisations face the challenges of sharp 
imbalances of power and access to resources, as 
well as social and status hierarchies – sometimes 
compounded by different ideologies. Yet some issue 
advocacy coalitions do manage to find common 
ground across constituencies to bring together policy 
analysis, monitoring, media outreach, legislative 
advocacy and community organising, as in the case of 
Ghana’s Oil 4 Agriculture campaign (see Box 6).  
Realistic analysis of CSO coalition dynamics requires 
unpacking the range of possible actors involved. 
The political logics and cultural styles of NGOs 
and broad-based membership organisations often 
differ, suggesting the need for negotiated terms of 
engagement. Grass-roots leaders may well fear that 
national capital-based CSOs might end up trading 
one set of top-down approaches for another, without 
seeking the kind of broader power shift in both 
state and society that they may feel is necessary 
for sustainable accountability to excluded citizens. 
Conversely, when more oppositional CSOs lean 
towards adversarial approaches, especially if they 
belong to social groups that feel less vulnerable, fear 
of reprisals may confine grass-roots organisations 
to ‘proper channels’, especially if they are dependent 
on or vulnerable to the ruling party. The ‘fear factor’ 
can point in the other direction as well; technically 
oriented thinktanks in national capitals, accustomed to 
elite policy dialogue, may be wary of partnering with 
social organisations that are perceived as ‘unruly’. In 
addition, in many countries national capital-based 
NGOs – understandably protective of their autonomy – 
have long histories of driving their own policy advocacy 
agendas in the absence of close consultation with 
broad-based social and civic organisations. For issues 
that technical elite policy dialogue is not sufficient to 
resolve, ‘people power’ may be necessary.27 
Longstanding ideological differences, social 
differences and money issues also tend to lurk in the 
background. If one participant perceives another 
as more loyal to a partisan agenda than to more 
tangible governance reform goals, that will complicate 
efforts to build the mutual trust that coalitions 
need to survive and be effective. Sharp differences 
in access to funding can also keep groups apart, 
especially if some are perceived as having privileged 
access to government or international funding, or 
if groups differ over the legitimacy of accepting 
such funds. Differences in social origin and status 
can also exacerbate trust issues. The leadership 
of more technical CSOs may have more in common 
socially with counterparts in government – similarly 
urban, middle-class professionals – than with grass-
roots rank-and-file members of pro-accountability 
social or civic movements. A specific form of social 
distance – stigma – can also complicate accountability 
initiatives that are focused on defending the rights of 
socially excluded groups. Culturally grounded support 
strategies are needed to nurture and protect collective 
action for those who are excluded and stigmatised by 
the dominant society. This underscores the importance 
of creating safe spaces that can nurture grass-roots 
organising among members of the most excluded 
groups, in order to offset stigma by creating the pride, 
collective identity and capacity for collective action 
that are preconditions for citizens to participate in 
The Oil 4 Agriculture campaign in Ghana advocates 
for the government’s oil income to be invested in 
smallholder agriculture. The African Centre for 
Energy Policy participates in a broad-based, multi-
sectoral CSO coalition that includes key public 
interest groups with broad-based membership 
organisations like the General Agriculture Workers’ 
Union and Peasant Farmers’ Association of Ghana, 
backed by an international advocacy alliance with 
Oxfam’s GROW campaign (Oil 4 Agriculture 2015). 
The campaign combined technical policy analysis 
and budget monitoring with radio, TV and online 
national awareness campaigns and citizen petitions 
to lobby the Finance Ministry, parliament and the 
International Monetary Fund to win a key initial 
victory. The government increased the agriculture 
allocation in the national oil fund from 2.5% 
in 2013 to 15.2% in 2014 (African Centre for 
Energy Policy reports that in practice agricultural 
spending actually reached 31% of the fund that 
year). Sustained grass-roots policy monitoring will 
still be key to ensure that the funds actually reach 
smallholder farmers, and there is also a broader 
effort to encourage the Ghanaian public at large to 
get involved in monitoring oil money. This initiative 
builds on past experience – key Ghananian public 
interest groups such as SEND and Friends of the 
Nation already have track records in using robust 
field-based findings from scaled-up, region-wide 
monitoring of governmental social programmes 
to identify bottlenecks and to propose specific 
improvement measures (Dogbe and Kwabane-
Adade 2012).
Box 6: Ghana’s Oil 4 Agriculture 
coalition combines policy 
monitoring and advocacy at 
international, national and local 
levels
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policy monitoring and advocacy for accountability (see 
Box 7). 
The need for cross-sectoral coalitions to pay deliberate 
attention to these issues of political difference and 
social distance, to build and sustain bridges across 
cultural and power gaps within civil society, as well 
as between society and the state, points towards the 
important role of interlocutors (defined as two-way, 
cross-cultural communicators) (Fowler 2014; Fox 
2014; Tembo 2013). 
Interlocutors can help different participants in multi-
sectoral coalitions to understand where the others 
are coming from, which is a key condition for finding 
common ground. If and when coalitions members 
manage to ‘agree to disagree’ over some issues in 
order to pursue shared goals, they then face the 
challenge of agreeing to – and sticking to – terms of 
engagement that address such key issues as how 
decisions are made, and who speaks for whom. Very 
basic practical issues, such as how groups based in the 
provinces can participate in national-level decisions 
can loom large. In this context, multi-sectoral coalitions 
for accountability face the challenge of building 
bridges and developing terms of engagement that 
are perceived by diverse participants as balanced and 
inclusive (Fox 2010).  
2.3 Final thoughts 
This chapter was inspired by extensive discussions of 
the Textbook Count experience, which in turn informed 
the conceptual framework that guides the other 
case studies included in this report. Though these 
case studies address a wide range of accountability 
campaigns, driven by coalitions of diverse actors, they 
address the potential synergy between advocacy and 
policy monitoring. These cases also analyse how each 
campaign faced the challenge of ‘taking scale into 
account’. The studies were also informed and enriched 
by extensive dialogue with campaigners who were 
directly involved. The result is a set of highly original, 
analytically informed case studies that provide a 
strong foundation to ground both more relevant future 
research and analytically informed strategising by 
accountability advocates. 
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Notes
1 This is a revised version of an essay also published in Fox and 
Aceron, with Guillán Montero (2016), which can be 
downloaded here. A revised, expanded version has also been 
published as Fox (2016). 
2 For almost a decade, this field has been called transparency 
and accountability (T&A). Recently, donors are more explicitly 
recognising the key role of citizen participation, as in the case 
of the Empowerment and Accountability Research 
Programme, funded by UK aid from the UK government, and 
the Hewlett Foundation’s new Global Development 
programme strategy (http://hewlett.org/programs/global-
development-and-population/amplifying-voices/
transparency-participation-and-accountability).
3 For example, while the Open Government Partnership has 
grown to 70 member countries from its original eight in 2011, 
the Independent Reporting Mechanisms’ review of the 
founding countries’ second National Action Plans indicates 
that from the total 185 commitments, only 11 are potentially 
transformational, and of those only nine made substantial 
progress in implementation. Indeed, AID Data’s recent study 
of international efforts to promote institutional change 
underscored the capacity of vested interests to resist change 
(Parks, Rice and Custer 2015).
4 Another challenge is the ebb and flow of donor enthusiasm 
for certain kinds of initiatives, which can end up complicating 
sustainability, as in the case of civil society procurement 
monitoring in the mid-2000s in the Philippines (a boom 
followed by a bust).
5 This phrase is a reference to a widely circulated 2014 
manifesto that called for ‘doing development differently’. 
See: http://doingdevelopmentdifferently.com
6 This is the conclusion of Chayes’ compelling recent analysis 
of ‘acute kleptocracies’, and what she calls the ‘vertical 
integration’ of power elites across scale (2015). She 
challenges the conventional wisdom insofar as she 
demonstrates the linkages between corruption, impunity and 
abuse of citizens at the local level and national political elites 
whose model of governance is based on a system-wide 
network of upwards resource extraction. Her insider 
perspective grounds a devastating critique of the role of the 
US Government in Afghanistan, arguing that US tolerance for 
systemic corruption feeds the causes of rebellion.
7 For extensive conceptual discussion of different meanings of 
the concept of scale, see Fox (2016).
8 In principle, government oversight agencies could do what 
vertical integration tries to do – reveal a full ‘X-ray’ of the 
entire chain of public sector decisions and performance in 
any given sector – yet very few agencies have the necessary 
autonomy, capacity and mandate to do so. Those rare 
government agencies should certainly be the focus of both 
civil society and international support. More often, the best 
that government oversight agencies can do is respond to 
scandals with official investigations that may expose the 
chain of events behind specific incidents. But such oversight 
rarely addresses broader issues of the effectiveness of entire 
policies, programmes or institutions – and more often in the 
anti-corruption context than with broader governance 
failures such as systemic ineffectiveness or social exclusion.
9 For definition and discussion of ‘proof of concept’, see Fox 
(2014).
10 This box draws from Fox (2007b).
11 This point is developed in response to debates over questions 
of terminology and the politics of discourse in the field of 
accountability (Fox and Halloran 2016).
12 Even in one of the most cited cases in which ‘information is 
power’ practices demonstrated impact, the newspaper 
dissemination of Uganda school-funding allocations, the 
results were not as dramatic as initially appeared. While the 
share of funds diverted dropped sharply, the overall level of 
spending grew, so the actual amount of funding leakage 
dropped only 12% (Hubbard 2007: 8 Reinikka and Svennson 
2004a, 2004b).
13 Trasparencia’s founder, Manuel Fernández de Villegas, chose 
this alternative spelling of the Spanish word for transparency 
because of concerns about communicating to grass-roots 
constituencies. In his view, the conventional version of 
transparency – a term at the time unknown in rural Mexico 
– sounded too close to a colloquial term widely used to 
describe fraud and deceit (‘transa’). 
14 The World Development Report’s contribution was less clear in 
countries that had experienced decades of state–society 
bargaining over the recognition and inclusion of autonomous 
social and civil organisations (e.g. the Philippines, India, 
Brazil, Mexico). In some countries, governments launched 
large-scale, official social accountability initiatives long 
before the World Bank spelled out its rationale. This was the 
case in Mexico, which created an institutional framework for 
(narrowly defined) ‘social oversight’ in the early 1990s (see, 
for example, Craig, Cornelius and Fox 1994).
15 For an application of the ‘last mile’ concept to analysis of 
efforts by senior-level policy reformers to encourage 
improved frontline public sector performance in the context 
of social audits in Andhra Pradesh, India, see Veeraraghavan 
(2015). Note that from a ‘citizens’ eye’ view, the ‘last mile’ of 
service provision actually looks like the ‘first mile’.
16 The World Development Report also declined to address the 
frequent tendency for local-citizen voice initiatives to be 
captured by local elites and turned into instruments of 
clientelism (e.g. in the case of ‘community-managed’ 
schools, see Altschuler 2013). World Bank researchers later 
showed that this pattern of capture was a systemic risk to 
‘induced’ (i.e. top-down) community participation efforts 
(Mansuri and Rao 2013). 
17 ‘Invited spaces’ are arenas for dialogue between authorities 
and citizens in which the terms of engagement are set by the 
authorities. ‘Claimed’ or ‘created spaces’, in contrast, are 
spaces which have been “claimed by less powerful actors 
from or against the power holders, or created more 
autonomously by them” (Cornwall and Schattan Coelho 
2007; Gaventa 2006: 27). The Community Food Council 
experience shows that invited spaces can be claimed from 
below and gain autonomy in spite of official resistance (in 
this case thanks in part to a sandwich strategy). As one 
director of Diconsa exhorted in a national meeting of the 
more autonomous Food Councils: “you push below, and we 
will squeeze from above” (Fox 1992).
18 ‘Free spaces’ are enabling environments for autonomous 
collective action by members of subordinated social groups 
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(Polletta 1999). 
19 For example, in the state of Guerrero, with a long tradition 
of autonomous, region-wide self-management initiatives, 
autonomous leaders controlled seven of the state’s 15 
Community Food Councils in the mid-2000s. At the time, 
senior Diconsa officials were willing to tolerate that degree 
of autonomy, but they used all the means at their disposal to 
prevent autonomous forces from gaining control over an 
eighth council, because that would have allowed them to 
lead the official state-wide association of regional councils 
(Fox 2007b). In 2015, according to new field reports from 
Marcos Méndez Lara in the state of Guerrero, even the most 
consolidated and autonomous councils have been 
significantly weakened by agency hostility, attempts at 
politicisation by the ruling party and the deterioration of 
citizen security.
20 This is a cautionary tale, insofar as it points to a risk in 
which the larger the organisation’s base, the greater the 
incentive for the government to attempt to co-opt 
stakeholder representatives, precisely because scaled-up, 
autonomous organisations have more bargaining power. 
This recalls the classic challenge recognised by sociologists 
more than a century ago in ‘the iron law of oligarchy’, which 
describes the tendency of leaders of large membership 
organisations to develop their own interests, distinct from 
those of their base. This underscores the importance of 
robust checks and balances within membership 
organisations to sustain internal democracy (Fox 2007b).
21 In order to make the case for coordinating policy monitoring 
and advocacy, this discussion considers these two 
approaches as distinct. That said, practitioners who already 
seek to articulate the two may frame one as subordinate to 
the other. For those CSOs that put advocacy strategy first, 
monitoring may be seen as one of their many tactics. In 
contrast, for CSOs that see problem-solving policy 
monitoring as their primary strategy, they may see advocacy 
as a tactic (for example, for CSOs to get a foot in the door 
with policy-makers to launch the monitoring process, as in 
the Textbook Count case). Here, in order to focus on the 
challenges involved in articulating monitoring and advocacy, 
the discussion will not assume that one is the strategy and 
the other is a tactic. Thanks to Rosie McGee for suggesting 
clarification of this point.
22 The thousands of village-level social audits in Andhra 
Pradesh were convened by a semi-governmental agency, so 
they are ‘invited spaces’, but these experiences challenge 
the frequent assumption that such openings from above are 
necessarily designed to divert or silence conflict. In both 
India’s social audits and in the case of Mexico’s Community 
Food Councils, non-partisan but government-backed 
community organisers convened invited spaces to create 
safe spaces for collective action that combined monitoring 
and sometimes adversarial grass-roots advocacy. These two 
large-scale experiences both underscore the potential 
synergy between monitoring and advocacy, and disrupt the 
conventional dichotomy between invited and autonomous 
spaces.
23 The term ‘constructive engagement’ carries its own 
historical baggage, as it was the name for US President 
Ronald Reagan’s policy of support for the apartheid regime 
in South Africa. 
24 This underscores the distinction between a narrow 
definition of transparency (limited to public access to 
official documents and data) and the broader notion of the 
public’s right to know, which goes further to include access 
to information about who are the winners and losers of 
government decisions, and about how those decisions (and 
non-decisions) were made.
25 Stone (1989) spelled out the crucial agenda-setting power of 
framing in her discussion of the importance of ‘causal stories’ 
for targeting and weakening obstacles to change.
26 Two exceptions in terms of scaled-up autonomous power 
include the 1999 national campaign to lobby Congress to 
prevent the Treasury Ministry from eliminating the 
programme, and the first several years of state-wide 
networking in Guerrero, also in the late 1990s. After that 
period, the autonomous councils’ insider allies lost power 
(Fox 2007b).
27 For a study of anti-corruption initiatives that emphasises 
‘people power’ over more technical approaches, see Beyerle 
(2014).
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3. Contextualising vertical 
integration in Philippine civil society  
Joy Aceron and Francis Isaac  
It is often said that the Philippines has a vibrant and 
dynamic civil society, as “thousands of voluntary 
organisations addressing various concerns dot the 
country’s sociopolitical landscape” (Ferrer 1997: 
1). Some of these groups provide a host of services 
(such as rural health delivery and legal aid), while 
“confront[ing] state power by raising alternative 
paradigms and courses of action” (Constantino-
David 1997: 21). This noticeable feature of Philippine 
politics has been one of the lasting legacies of the 
People Power Revolution, which not only overthrew 
authoritarian rule in 1986, but also created various 
mechanisms for citizens’ engagement and direct 
people’s participation.  
3.1 The beginnings of Philippine 
civil society
The first voluntary associations in the Philippines began 
to appear during the late sixteenth century, at the 
onset of Spanish colonisation. But these organisations 
were religious in character and received considerable 
encouragement from the colonial authorities as a form 
of social control.  
A functional civil society did not emerge in the 
Philippines until 1946, when “the modern Filipino 
state arose out of the late Spanish and American 
colonial periods” (Ibid.: 13). Most of these groups, 
however, were organisationally weak and poorly 
institutionalised, since “traditional solidarities 
and patron-client structures largely blocked the 
emergence of autonomous, self-governing entities 
between the state and society” (Ibid.: 15). In fact, 
some of the first civil society organisations (CSOs) 
in the country that still exist today, the people’s 
organisations (POs), were formed under the 
administration of former dictator President Ferdinand 
Marcos as a conduit to deliver services and neutralise 
the left-wing movements that were waging armed 
resistance against the dictatorship. By and large, 
because of the nature of their creation, these POs are 
not used to claim-making and checking those who are 
in power. Meanwhile, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) were formed to support social movements and 
mass-based organisations that can be traced back to 
anti-colonial revolutionary movements. 
Shortly after the fall of the dictatorship, a new 
constitution was promulgated directing the state to 
“encourage non-governmental, community-based, 
or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare 
of the nation” (Article II; Section 23). Several legal 
measures were also introduced to promote citizens’ 
participation and create a more enabling environment 
for CSOs. These new laws mandated the creation of 
participatory bodies in every province, city, municipality 
and barangay (village), which were then tasked with 
crafting the development plans of their respective local 
governments.  
This highly favourable environment resulted in a 
sudden increase of CSOs in the Philippines. After the 
1986 People Power revolution (EDSA 1), the country 
became a haven for CSOs playing a wide variety of 
functions: to articulate the issues and concerns of 
the people; to provide policy inputs; to lobby for or 
protest against specific government policies and 
programmes; to organise citizens and provide them 
with educational and capacity-building support; to co-
implement programmes and projects with government 
and assist in service delivery; to provide services to 
areas and sectors that are left unattended by the 
government; and to check and monitor government 
and evaluate government and governance in the 
country. 
3.2 ‘Champions’ in the state 
While civil society has generally been open to 
engagements with the state, the nature and extent 
of their relationship is largely dependent on the 
orientation of these CSOs as well as the attitude of the 
incumbent president (Quimpo 2008).  
The presidency of Fidel Ramos, for example, was 
marked by a relatively high degree of openness 
towards civil society participation. This eventually 
culminated in the crafting of the Social Reform Agenda, 
which had significant input from various CSOs. In a 
nutshell, the document contained a host of measures 
intended to empower marginalised groups and ensure 
greater citizen participation in decision-making.  
The relationship, however, turned sour when 
Ramos’ successor Joseph Estrada was implicated 
in numerous corruption scandals, which led to his 
impeachment. Civil society groups organised massive 
demonstrations in Manila, demanding the members of 
the Senate (which was convened as an impeachment 
court) to convict Estrada of plunder. The Senate, 
however, was not able to complete the trial, after the 
prosecution walked out in protest against the alleged 
manipulation of the president’s allies. This triggered 
a wave of anger on the streets, leading to Estrada’s 
ousting in January 2001 in an event now known in the 
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Philippines as ‘People Power ll’.
This incident marked a turning point in civil society’s 
approach to anti-corruption. Instead of solely relying 
on protest politics and various forms of agitation, 
a growing number of CSOs began to engage the 
government in earnest to fight corruption. This meant 
a shift in perspective from a stance wherein civil society 
takes on the role of political opposition, to one that 
involves partnership, collaboration and constructive 
engagement with the state. It was during this time that 
the Philippine government adopted an anti-corruption 
strategy, alongside an anti-corruption programme 
launched by the World Bank. 
3.3 Emergence of social 
accountability  
Coincidentally, it was also in 2001 that CSOs began 
to adopt social accountability as one of the strategies 
that they employ in their respective reform work. 
Social accountability as it was adopted at this time 
generally employed constructive engagements between 
state reformists and civil society actors in the effort 
to improve government performance. This wave of 
initiatives – most of which no longer exist – focused 
on procurement monitoring, contract implementation 
and service delivery. But because of the technical 
knowledge needed in its application, CSOs also had 
to devote their efforts to mobilising and training 
ordinary citizens in a variety of social accountability 
(SAcc) initiatives (ANSA-EAP 2012). Among the 
major networks and coalitions on transparency 
and accountability formed during this decade were 
Transparency and Accountability Network and the 
business-church-CSO anti-corruption coalition, 
Coalition Against Corruption. 
While social accountability yielded a number of 
positive results during the administration of President 
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, these good practices 
were mostly scattered and sporadic cases with no 
assurance of expansion and sustainability. This was 
aggravated by the political crisis that overtook the 
Arroyo administration in 2005, when the president 
was accused of massive vote fraud. As public anger 
poured onto the streets, the administration began to 
impose repressive measures that threatened basic civil 
liberties.  
Eventually, Arroyo’s husband was also implicated 
in numerous corruption scandals, which practically 
nullified whatever small gains were achieved 
through social accountability. Worse, the Philippines 
experienced the worst democratic rollback since the 
Marcos dictatorship, which affected any prospect of 
citizens’ participation in politics.  
3.4 Participatory governance as a 
centrepiece platform 
State–civil society relations only began to improve 
when Benigno Aquino III took over the presidency 
in 2010. With the slogan “Daang Matuwid” (Straight 
Path), Aquino quickly invited prominent CSO leaders to 
join his cabinet – thus opening up the state to citizens’ 
engagement like never before. Civil society stalwarts 
who were appointed to key government positions soon 
undertook efforts to promote participatory governance 
in their respective departments.  
Overall, anti-corruption and good governance became 
the Aquino administration’s topmost priorities, 
thereby putting considerable effort into enhancing 
transparency, providing greater access to information 
and expanding the various platforms for civil society 
participation. This was apparent in the budget 
process, with information now easily available to 
ordinary citizens and CSOs who wanted to engage and 
participate in the budget process.  
Another important reform initiative was the Seal of 
Good Housekeeping (SGH) which was implemented a 
year after the Aquino administration assumed power. 
A brainchild of the late Interior Secretary Jesse 
Robredo, the SGH is an incentive programme that 
encourages local government units (LGUs) to make key 
documents and information transparent and accessible 
to the public. Its implementation was an important 
touchstone in local politics since most LGUs have been 
under the control of political families who see no need 
for transparency and accountability. Through this 
programme, LGUs are not only encouraged to become 
more transparent, but it also laid the groundwork for 
the active engagement of citizens in local governance. 
 
The Aquino government, in addition, pursued efforts in 
exacting accountability from the Arroyo administration. 
The first to fall was Merceditas Gutierrez, who resigned 
as Ombudsman on April 29, 2011 after she was 
impeached by the House of Representatives on March 
22. Rumoured to be a close friend of the Arroyo family, 
Gutierrez was accused of mishandling the cases filed 
against the former president and her family.  
A year later, Renato Corona was also removed as 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court after a four-month 
impeachment trial by the Philippine Senate. Corona’s 
conviction stemmed from his failure to publicly disclose 
his statement of assets, liabilities and net worth as 
required in the constitution. In both these cases, 
administration efforts were complemented by civil 
society action, which wanted an end to corruption and 
the removal of Arroyo’s remaining allies.  
Recently, plunder complaints were filed against three 
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senators for the alleged misuse of their pork barrel 
funds. This refers to the lump-sum discretionary fund 
to be spent for priority development projects identified 
by legislators. On average, senators are given an 
annual allocation of 200 million Philippine Pesos (PHP) 
(US$4.5 million), while their counterparts in the Lower 
House receive PHP70 million (US$1.56 million).  
According to a special audit report of the Commission 
on Audit released in August 2013 (COA 2013), the 
three senators, along with several other legislators, 
misused their pork barrel funds by diverting the monies 
to fake foundations set up by businesswoman Janet 
Lim-Napoles. Estimates reveal that the government lost 
PHP10 billion that were supposed to be used to assist 
small farmers. Unsurprisingly, the public was enraged 
when news of the scandal broke out. This eventually 
ignited the peaceful protest action in August 2013 
called the #MillionPeopleMarch, which was the biggest 
gathering of anti-corruption forces organised since 
Aquino took power. 
However, despite the reform measures implemented 
by the Aquino administration, it still has its fair share 
of shortcomings and criticisms. One glaring example 
was its seeming reluctance to pass the hugely popular 
Freedom of Information (FOI) Bill. Despite its strong 
anti-corruption stance, the administration’s leadership 
in shepherding the Bill was palpably absent, which led 
to its legislative demise. This setback was a crushing 
disappointment for civil society groups such as the 
Right to Know Right Now Coalition (RKRN), which has 
been lobbying for the passage of the FOI Bill for years. 
It remains uncertain how civil society will fare under the 
presidency of Rodrigo Duterte. While some civil society 
groups welcome this change of administration, others 
are more cautious and would rather wait for events to 
unfold before they make any bold move.  
But regardless of how civil society will engage the 
government in the next six years, it will have to put its 
vast experience to good use if it is to gain more reforms 
and successfully manoeuvre in the shifting landscape of 
Philippine politics.  
3.5 How does vertical integration 
fit in?
Because the Philippines is “usually described as a 
strong civil society type” (Ferrer 1997: 1), it is highly 
probable for an advanced strategy such as vertical 
integration to be employed in the country even if the 
exact language is not yet widely used. Recent historical 
trends have made it compelling and conducive for civil 
society to integrate their campaigns in order to better 
address pressing societal concerns. We have identified 
three historical trends that are now enabling civil 
society to employ facets of vertical integration.  
The first trend is the history of state–civil society 
interaction in the Philippines, wherein a vibrant civil 
society is forced to confront a weak Filipino state that is 
less than able to enforce its own rules and deliver basic 
public services. As Marlon Wui and Glenda Lopez point 
out, “the elite-dominated and inefficient state did not 
necessarily go away” with the fall of the Marcos regime, 
even as the new dispensation “opened up new avenues 
through which civil society can make an impact 
directly on how the state governs and what program of 
governance it will adopt” (1997: 1).  
The second trend is an offshoot of the first, and it 
pertains to the decentralisation process that began 
shortly after the People Power Revolution of 1986. For 
instance, a few months after coming to power, Corazon 
Aquino’s new administration issued a document entitled 
“The Policy Agenda for People Oriented Development,” 
which pledged to reorganise the government based on 
the principle of decentralisation (Atienza 2006: 425).  
Then, by 1987, a new constitution was ratified, 
which contained a provision mandating the State to 
“ensure the autonomy of local governments” (Article 
I; Section 25). Article X further reinforced local 
autonomy by: (1) granting LGUs the power to create 
their own sources of revenue, as well as levy taxes, 
fees and charges; (2) providing local governments 
with a just share of the national taxes which are then 
automatically released to them; and (3) entitling LGUs 
to an equitable share in the proceeds of the utilisation 
and development of the national wealth within their 
respective areas (Atienza 2006: 425).  
These powers were further institutionalised through 
Republic Act No. 7160, more popularly known as 
the Local Government Code. Enacted in 1991, the 
Code shortly became a “landmark piece of legislation 
governing the conduct of LGUs, their relations with 
each other, and with the national government” 
(Ocampo-Salvador 1999: 133).  
Described by Filipino scholar Maria Ela Atienza as 
“revolutionary or radical in character”, the Code 
has four features “that set it apart from previous 
decentralization attempts in the country” (2006: 
427). First, this measure transfers the delivery of 
certain basic services (such as health, agriculture and 
public works) to local governments. Second, local 
governments have been granted certain regulatory 
and licensing powers (such as the reclassification of 
agricultural lands, the enforcement of environmental 
laws, the operation of tricycles and the implementation 
of the National Building Code, among others). 
Third, the Code broadens the taxing powers of local 
governments in order to increase their financial 
resources; and lastly, the Code provides a “policy 
framework for the direct involvement of civil society in 
local governance” (Ibid.: 427).  
It is this aspect of the Local Government Code that 
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paves the way for the third major trend in recent 
Philippine history – increasing civil society participation 
in governance. In the Local Government Code alone, 
several mechanisms have been introduced to ensure 
direct civil society involvement. This is done by:  
• allocating a specific number of seats for CSO 
representatives in local special bodies such as the 
local development council, the local health board 
and the local school board; 
• providing sectoral representation in the local 
legislative councils, to represent women, workers 
and other sectors as determined by the council; 
• ensuring civil society involvement in local planning 
and in the implementation of local development 
programmes; 
• encouraging CSO participation in various political 
exercises such as plebiscites, referendum and recall.  
These mechanisms were put in place because the Code 
sees civil society as “active partners in the pursuit of local 
autonomy” (Section 34). In fact, the law even instructs all 
local government units to “provide assistance, financial 
or otherwise, to such people’s and non-governmental 
organizations for economic, socially-oriented, 
environmental, or cultural projects to be implemented 
within its territorial jurisdiction” (Section 36).  
Such provisions of the Local Government Code are, in 
turn, based on the 1987 Constitution, which mandates 
the state to encourage the self-organising activities 
of CSOs (Article II; Section 23). The same document 
further stipulates that “the right of the people and their 
organizations to effective and reasonable participation 
at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-
making shall not be abridged,” adding that, “the State 
shall, by law, facilitate the establishment of adequate 
consultation mechanisms” (Article XIII; Section 16).  
Maximising the hard-won democratic space that was 
created after the fall of the Marcos dictatorship, civil 
society began to view the government no longer 
“with antagonism tempered with fear and suspicion” 
(INCITEGov 2008: 23), but as “a strategic arena for 
engagement” (Ibid.: 25). For this reason, several 
CSOs began forging “partnership agreements with the 
government that ranged from government-initiated 
partnerships, funder-initiated programs, and NGO-
managed projects” (Ibid.: 24). By the 1990s, good 
governance has become a buzzword in the Philippines; 
and before long, both the government and civil society 
were promoting the three core good governance 
principles of transparency, accountability and citizens’ 
participation. In the decade that followed, a number of 
CSOs began using the concept of social accountability 
in anti-corruption efforts.  
It was at that time that the country began to witness 
the crossover phenomenon, with civil society leaders 
joining government in massive numbers “to pursue 
the reforms that they have been advocating or 
prototyping for a long time” (Juliano-Soliman 2008: 
9). This phenomenon was first recorded during the 
administration of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Tapped 
for both their leadership and technical skills, “NGO 
personalities were asked to assume the role of Cabinet 
members ... and play central roles in governance” 
(INCITEGov 2008: 28).   
However, while the large number of CSOs engaging 
with the government became the hallmark of the 
post-Marcos period, not all of these efforts were 
vertically integrated. In fact, only a few civil society 
groups from the more mainstream social accountability 
tradition used vertical integration, though there was 
an explosion of SAcc initiatives in the Philippines that 
began in the early 2000s.  
Intended to prevent government corruption, most of 
these efforts took the form of citizens’ monitoring that 
cover various aspects of governance. This includes 
textbook delivery (Textbook Count), school buildings 
(Bayanihang Eskwela), medicine procurement 
(Medicine Monitoring Project), road construction 
(Bantay Lansangan), pork barrel projects (PDAF 
Watch), state appointments (Appointments Watch), 
campaign finance (Pera’t Pulitika), revenue generation 
(Bantay Kita), school performance (checkmyschool), 
general bidding processes, and even politicians’ 
lifestyles (Lifestyle Check).  
However, with the exception of Textbook Count and 
Bantay Lansangan, most SAcc initiatives were hardly 
nationwide in scope. A large number of these efforts 
were engaged in ground- or local-level monitoring, 
coupled with engagements with policy-makers / 
government decision-makers at the top. As such, 
most national-level advocacies gave little attention to 
legislative / policy reforms, and were largely concerned 
with ensuring government response to their monitoring 
findings and seeking improvements in implementation.  
One of the initiatives with a policy advocacy component 
is the RKRN coalition, a broad civil society network 
that is pushing for the passage of the FOI Bill. Its 
membership is nationwide in scope, and is composed 
of groups involved in transparency and accountability, 
as well as basic sectoral formations. Its engagements, 
however, have largely focused on lobbying and policy 
advocacy at the national level. Though the coalition 
has undertaken a number of local activities in the past, 
these are sporadic in character and are not part of its 
overall campaign strategy.  
Interestingly, the most vertically integrated campaigns 
were initiated by progressive social movements. In 
fact, it was the more radical progressives that mostly 
organised the major efforts on agrarian reform, anti-
mining, indigenous peoples’ rights and reproductive 
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health. Combining grass-roots organising with national-
level advocacy and coalition work, these organisations 
were able to effectively engage the various levels of the 
state, using protest action, lobbying and hard-nosed 
negotiations.  
However, there are also vertically integrated campaigns 
that can best be described as hybrid initiatives, wherein 
progressive social movements use social accountability 
to pursue their issues. This is apparent in the 
housing and disaster risk reduction and management 
campaigns, which combine protest politics with 
performance monitoring.  
Ironically, while a number of initiatives employ vertical 
integration, the very groups that are directly involved 
in these campaigns do not use the term ‘vertical 
integration’. However, there are a few exceptions, such 
as the Alternative Law Group, a member-organisation of 
Alyansa Tigil Mina that openly uses vertical integration 
as part of its strategy. The RIGHTS / Katarungan 
Network also claims to use vertical integration, coupled 
with horizontal integration referring to the extent and 
spread of the mass base of the peasant organisations 
and their allies to advance land reform.  
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4. Case study summaries  
4.1 Mobilising citizens for 
transparency and accountability in 
education through Textbook Count 
Joy Aceron 
Textbook Count was a joint programme of the 
Department of Education and Government Watch 
(G-Watch), a programme of the Ateneo School of 
Government that implements accountability initiatives 
with civil society organisations (CSOs). The programme 
aimed to ensure that the right quantity of textbooks, 
of the right quality, reached public school students 
at the right time, following the right processes. With 
support from donors including the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), the Asia Foundation 
and the Partnership for Transparency Fund, G-Watch 
coordinated CSO participation in Textbook Count for 
four rounds between 2003 and 2007. The Department 
of Education covered other direct expenses, particularly 
those involving government officials and staff. 
Numerous studies have noted the success of Textbook 
Count and have attributed it to three factors: (1) 
leadership or the presence of champions in the 
Department of Education; (2) the presence of civil 
society monitors; and (3) engagement between state 
and non-state actors. While these factors are indeed 
critical, such explanations of Textbook Count’s success 
are rather too broad and general. They pay very little 
attention to the specific campaign strategies behind 
Textbook Count, which enabled the actors involved to 
succeed. This case study reflects on some of processes, 
mechanisms, actors and activities at play at various 
stages and levels of the programme, which made it 
possible for civil society monitoring to cover all the 
possible vulnerabilities to corruption and inefficiency 
of the government’s Textbook Delivery Programme. 
It attempts to unbundle processes at every level, and 
measure the intensity of the actions / tactics per level 
using vertical integration as a framework for analysis. 
4.1.1 Keys to success
Textbook Count prided itself on contributing to the 
achievement of a number of significant results. It 
contributed to reducing the unit price of textbooks 
from between 80 and 120 Philippine Pesos (PHP) in 
1999 to between PHP30 and PHP45 in 2006–2007; 
it shortened the average textbook procurement cycle 
from 24 months to 12; and it improved the Department 
of Education’s trust rating. Textbook Count’s vertical 
integration is considered pivotal to its success. CSO 
monitoring in Textbook Count, coordinated by G-Watch 
from 2003 to 2007, covered the Department of 
Education’s entire textbook delivery programme, from 
procurement at the central office level to distribution 
at the district / school level. This was accomplished 
by building a coalition with various national / broad-
based and local CSOs for the mobilisation of volunteer-
monitors on the ground, covering up to 80% of 
textbook delivery points – in high schools and district 
offices – across the country. 
Because CSOs covered all the critical stages of 
the Department of Education’s textbook delivery 
programme, there was a proactive effort to ensure 
compliance with standards of quantity, quality and 
processes. This prevented or minimised the kind of 
non-compliance with standards that led to pilferage, 
inefficiencies, anomalies or corruption. What enabled 
this was the nationwide and vertically integrated 
mobilisation of CSOs from national to school levels. The 
coordination and communication among G-Watch and 
CSOs in Textbook Count paralleled the structure of the 
Textbook Delivery Programme, particularly in terms of 
the flow of information and booking. This also ensured 
that books were easily consolidated at the national 
level, from which data and information were generated 
to serve as the basis for recommendations that were 
responded to by decision-makers in the Department of 
Education. 
Among the CSO participants in the Textbook Count 
initiative were the National Citizens’ Movement for 
Free Elections, which is a clean elections watchdog 
group, and the Boy and Girl Scouts of the Philippines, 
an organisation that undertakes voluntary service. 
Scouts and volunteers from local CSOs would gather 
at designated delivery points to ‘count’ the textbooks 
upon delivery by suppliers that had won tenders. 
Textbook Count monitors would also check the physical 
quality of the textbooks and note their monitoring 
findings on a book form and an Inspection and 
Acceptance Book, which were collected at the national 
level by G-Watch to prepare the CSO book. 
4.1.2 Turning Textbook Count over to the 
government
In 2007, G-Watch implicitly ‘turned over’ Textbook 
Count to the Department of Education. The 
programme’s level of operationalisation, particularly 
the participation of CSOs, has been unclear since then. 
Many of the reform-oriented officials in the cabinet 
who had championed good governance either left or 
were quickly removed from office when, in 2005, the 
administration of former president Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo started to be implicated in several large-scale 
corruption scandals that caused political instability 
and crises in the country. One of these reform-oriented 
officials was the Department of Education Executive 
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who had championed Textbook Count. The absence of 
a strong reform-oriented champion in the Department 
of Education in the midst of an administration beset 
with corruption presented challenges in continuing 
to undertake a high-profile and nationally celebrated 
CSO–government good governance undertaking like 
Textbook Count.  
Meanwhile, there were growing expectations that social 
accountability initiatives such as Textbook Count should 
become self-sufficient or self-sustaining after years of 
donor support. This prompted the donors, such as the 
UNDP, to end their support for G-Watch to continue 
coordinating CSO monitoring in Textbook Count 
after four rounds of renewal. One of the funders, an 
intermediary donor, could no longer mobilise resources 
to continue supporting Textbook Count, and the other 
was expecting that the programme would already have 
been ‘institutionalised’ after years of implementation. At 
the same time, however, donors continued to support 
G-Watch by funding its subsequent engagements with 
the Department of Education. Other donors supported 
similar and related initiatives. 
This may indicate the tendency for donors to favour 
initiatives that are new and innovative, rather than 
continuing with existing processes that have been 
shown to work. These two factors drove G-Watch 
to ‘turn over’ Textbook Count to the Department of 
Education and to embark on a process of exploring 
more strategic and sustainable ways to ensure 
accountability in the department. Since then, 
G-Watch has undertaken social accountability 
initiatives covering strategic processes and projects / 
programmes within the Department of Education, in an 
effort to sustain CSO engagement with the department 
– albeit to a limited extent. 
G-Watch is also exploring ways to strengthen the 
‘supply side’ of accountability, particularly through 
strengthening control and accountability mechanisms 
inside the Department of Education, in collaboration 
with the middle-management allies that G-Watch has 
mobilised over the years, and a number of national and 
local partner CSOs. Thus far, this type of collaboration 
is yielding ways forward for social accountability 
that enable CSO monitoring to engage with the 
government’s own control and accountability systems.  
4.1.3 Lessons for vertically integrated 
campaigning
• Relatively speaking, Textbook Count’s weakest link 
in terms of scope and scale was at the provincial 
level, and its strongest monitoring capacity was 
at local and national levels; this pointed to the 
need for deliberate efforts to build coordination at 
the intermediary level, between the local and the 
national.
• Textbook Count served as an indirect advocacy 
initiative, supporting Department of Education 
officials who favoured enhanced participation, 
transparency and accountability, while providing 
evidence that could be used to constrain corrupt 
officials. 
• In accounting for the results or gains of a given 
initiative, it pays to understand the complexity of 
the multi-level and multifaceted actions that have 
to be undertaken, the wide variety of actors that 
need to be engaged, and the scope and limitations 
of the gains in light of the changing context in 
governance. 
4.2 Campaigning for agrarian 
reform in the Bondoc Peninsula 
Francis Isaac and Danilo Carranza 
The Bondoc Peninsula is a narrow strip of land 
located in the southern portion of Quezon province, 
approximately eight hours from Manila. It is composed 
of 12 low-income municipalities. Largely dependent on 
the production of coconut, the Bondoc Peninsula has a 
skewed system of land tenure under which ownership 
of large tracts is concentrated in the hands of a few 
elite families.  
The story of the agrarian reform campaign in the 
Bondoc Peninsula concerns the role of CSOs in enabling 
poor farmers to gain control of land. The campaign 
utilised various actions at different levels that enabled 
the rural poor to gain control of land. Such actions can 
be broadly categorised as constituency-building and 
interfacing with the state. 
4.2.1 Agrarian reform in the Philippines
In the Philippines, land ownership and control has 
been concentrated in the hands of a wealthy minority 
since colonial times, creating an impoverished class 
of landless peasants. Today’s campaigns for peasant 
rights are rooted in an enduring social movement with 
a long history of struggle and resistance. 
The first post-independence land reform policy, 
in 1972, delivered little change and triggered the 
emergence of several agrarian reform networks. In 
1988, following the fall of President Marcos and after 
years of campaigning, the Comprehensive Agrarian 
Reform Program (CARP) was passed, with the aim 
of reforming the ownership of 10.3 million hectares 
of farmland in favour of around 3.9 million peasant 
households. Originally, the CARP gave the government 
ten years to complete its land redistribution efforts, 
which was later extended for another ten years, 
resetting the deadline to 2008. But when the law finally 
expired in December of that year, more than 1.2 million 
hectares of agricultural land were still waiting to be 
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redistributed. Campaigning for the further extension 
of the CARP began as early as 2006, and following 
countless protest actions and mass mobilisations, the 
CARP Extension with Reforms (CARPER) was signed in 
2009, extending the reforms until 2014. 
4.2.2 Civil society actors and the Bondoc 
Peninsula campaign
The Quezon Association for Rural Development and 
Democratisation Services (QUARDDS) is a non-
governmental organisation (NGO) in the Bondoc 
Peninsula that provides technical assistance to the 
Kilusang Magbubukid ng Bondoc Peninsula (KMBP, 
Peasant Movement of Bondoc Peninsula), a district-
wide peasant federation. From the late 1990s, the 
organising efforts of QUARDDS and KMBP meant that 
large tracts of land in the Bondoc Peninsula were 
distributed to thousands of CARP beneficiaries, despite 
bureaucratic inefficiency and stiff landlord resistance. 
The first major breakthrough occurred in September 
1998, when a 174-hectare property belonging to the 
powerful Reyes family was redistributed to 56 peasant 
beneficiaries. And this was just the beginning. 
Over a span of 13 years, from 1996 to 2009, more than 
10,000 hectares were placed under the effective control 
of more than 3,800 farmers. Some was re-distributed by 
the government and some controlled through peasant 
initiatives. These efforts took the form of consistent social 
pressure from below and initiatives to build alliances with 
reformists in the Catholic Church  and agrarian reform 
advocates. They also included a variety of extra-legal 
actions – such as land occupation, boycott of tenancy 
sharing schemes and padlocking of government offices, 
among others – in order to compel the state to implement 
its own agrarian reform law. Because of the partnership 
between QUARDDS and KMBP, rural citizens were able 
to assert their rights at the village and municipal levels, 
where actual land contestation occurs. 
QUARDDS also enabled farmers to engage state 
agencies like the Department of Agrarian Reform at the 
both municipal and provincial levels as they pursued 
their land cases. It also facilitated coalition-building 
efforts at the provincial level in order to gain the support 
of other vital institutions such as the Catholic Church. 
Since the late 2000s, QUARDDS has been the local 
NGO partner of two national agrarian reform networks, 
the Rural Poor Institute for Land and Human Rights 
Services (known as RIGHTS Network) and Katarungan 
(Movement for Agrarian Reform and Social Justice), a 
peasant federation, of which KMBP is also a member. 
RIGHTS Network, established in 2008, is a network 
of 11 grass-roots NGOs working on agrarian reform. 
Katarungan was formed a year earlier by several 
provincial peasant formations to push for the extension 
of the CARP, and it initiated many of the protest actions 
that contributed to the passage of the CARPER in 2009. 
Katarungan enabled KMBP farmers to interact, to 
share experiences and to forge common strategies 
with rural citizens from other regions and provinces of 
the Philippines. RIGHTS Network, for its part, provided 
technical support to KMBP farmers, as well as working 
with QUARDDS to deploy community organisers to 
catalyse action at the local level. It also helped in the 
pursuit of their cases at the national level, facilitating 
dialogues with pertinent government agencies, doing 
media work, forming alliances with important groups 
and institutions such as churches and political parties, 
and facilitating international fact-finding missions. 
KMBP, QUARDDS, Katarungan and RIGHTS Network 
also monitor the Department of Agrarian Reform’s 
implementation of CARPER from the municipal to the 
national level to inform their advocacy, and run public 
education campaigns using radio and newspapers. 
4.2.3 Lessons for vertically integrated 
campaigning
• Coalition-building was scaled up from the grass 
roots as organised peasant groups, reacting to 
the strength of landlord power, first established 
relationships with other groups in their municipality, 
then formed provincial, regional and eventually 
national federations.
• Many CSOs involved in the coalition also engaged in 
cross-sectoral coalition-building, establishing strong 
relationships – especially with the Catholic Church 
and media – that delivered important gains for the 
campaign.
• The peasant movement’s engagement with the 
state has mostly taken the form of protest actions 
and pressure politics at multiple levels, and it has 
had only limited engagement in spaces where the 
government has invited people to participate.  
4.3 Empowering communities for 
housing and community services 
Benedict G. Nisperos and Frederick Vincent Marcelo 
The Philippines, with its booming population, faces 
a massive housing problem. Informal housing 
arrangements, substandard structures, congestion, 
a lack of relocation areas, rising criminality in 
overcrowded spaces, land-use conflicts and a lack of 
access to social services characterise this housing 
dilemma.  
In the 1990s, widespread demolitions displaced many 
informal settlers in Metro Manila. Victims and their 
families responded by organising themselves. Among 
those that organised early was the umbrella organisation 
Damayan ng Maralitang Pilipinong Api (DAMPA, 
Philippines Poverty Relief). It was created to demand 
not just housing and relocation from different levels of 
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government, but also the social services that should go 
with them. 
4.3.1 DAMPA’s activities and scope
DAMPA organised poor communities around common 
basic issues through building a partnership with the 
government, enhancing community-based self-help 
initiatives, and initiating pro-poor legislation at both 
the local and national government levels. It presented 
viable solutions to basic poverty problems endemic to 
the urban poor – such as inadequate and unaffordable 
housing, evictions and relocation – which complied with 
both international and local standards, the provision of 
basic services, and literacy and livelihood development. 
Through these effective approaches, DAMPA was 
able to grow its membership. This large membership, 
composed mainly of women, became an important 
source of leverage in negotiations with the state.  
In terms of scale, DAMPA is active in six major regions 
in the Philippines and has engaged with 90,000 
households. It has helped about 5,000 families to 
secure land and housing tenure; helped set up 40 
community pharmacies in 30 poor communities, 
providing low-cost generic medicines to an estimated 
50,000 poor families; and run an Income Restoration 
Programme that benefitted 252 families.  
DAMPA considers its greatest impact to be developing 
the capacity of 500 urban poor leaders and volunteers 
in 95 communities to address local problems 
more effectively. These leaders sit on various local 
government development and planning bodies, where 
they actively participate in local governance and 
development planning activities in their localities. 
DAMPA has achieved a number of key victories as a 
result of its organising work. In 2009, for example, it 
assisted 31 informal settler families from Sitio Krusher 
in the municipality of Norzagaray, Bulacan province. 
They were involved in tense relations with their 
homeowner neighbours, who wanted to have them 
evicted. To prevent this from happening, community 
organisers from DAMPA – assisted by leaders from the 
left-leaning Akbayan Citizens’ Action Party – organised 
a dialogue between the concerned parties. The result 
was that the landowner donated a 2,694m2 lot to the 
informal settler families, on the condition that they pay 
the taxes on it. To date, DAMPA continues to provide 
capacity-building training to the Sitio Krusher families. 
Another success story involved 2,000 informal settlers 
in the areas of Bangkal and Magallanes in Makati 
City, who had to be relocated to give way to several 
government infrastructure projects. DAMPA brokered 
a deal with both the national and local governments, 
which enabled the residents to acquire land through 
a ‘negotiated relocation’ and entitled them to a small 
grant to construct their houses. DAMPA assisted the 
residents in developing their new community, not 
leaving until the basic social services such as schools, 
roads, potable water and electricity were set up.  
While DAMPA’s primary strategy remains community 
organising around grass-roots issues, a strong 
networking strategy has also been integral to its 
activities. Through continuous engagement and 
active participation in the spaces it has opened for 
collaboration, DAMPA has been able to build a very 
wide local and international network. Furthermore, 
engaging in dialogue with the government and other 
stakeholders at different levels has afforded the leaders 
and ordinary members of grass-roots organisations the 
opportunity to acquire new skills and knowledge, and to 
hone their expertise. As such, they have become more 
knowledgeable about local and national government 
processes, and calibrate their responses and activities 
according to this new knowledge.  
Through lobbying, coordination and constituency-
building at different levels of government – even 
extending to the international level – DAMPA has been 
able to claim spaces where the urban poor can voice 
their concerns, and to institutionalise some of these 
spaces. It advanced the requirement for consultation 
in relocation activities and the participation of citizens 
in decision-making for housing and relocation projects 
affecting them. This has been achieved through 
participation in deliberative processes and decision-
making at local urban poor and housing offices, and 
at the national level through the National Housing 
Authority and other agencies under the Housing Urban 
Development Coordinating Council. 
4.3.2 Lessons for vertically integrated 
advocacy
• DAMPA considers its network of constituents, 
members and partners as its greatest resource 
for vertical integration. It was able to overcome 
populism and clientelism by building on the 
knowledge that it acquired through collaboration 
and networking within its constituency.
• For DAMPA, vertical integration is a chance to learn 
and to strengthen the organisation and its members.
• DAMPA recognises that it was able to vertically 
integrate its activities because of its understanding 
of its own strengths and weaknesses, and of how 
institutions operate, how power structures at the 
different levels of government affect the results of 
advocacy, and how best to engage the government 
at different levels. 
4.4 Intensifying the anti-mining 
campaign 
Benedict G. Nisperos and Rhia Muhi 
The Philippines has a mining law that is contested by 
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several sectors due to the inadequate environmental 
protection that it offers lands and communities. The 
law allows forest clearance, free exploitation of water, 
easement rights and the use of explosives with low fees 
and penalties. It does not provide effective protection 
of the rights of mining-affected communities, nor does 
it recognise the ownership of natural resources by 
communities of indigenous peoples. 
This flawed law, together with high-profile coverage 
of several mining disasters in the Philippines, raised 
the consciousness of several communities affected by 
the ill effects of mining, and intensified the existing 
anti-mining campaign. Thus, in 2000, when one of the 
Philippines’ biggest mining companies planned new 
operations in a town in Surigao del Norte, Mindanao, 
community members began organising themselves to 
prevent the potential degradation of their lands. The 
Anislagan Bantay Kalikasan Task Force (ABAKATAF), a 
community-based organisation (CBO), strengthened 
its ranks by fighting the insidious efforts of different 
mining companies to enter and mine their lands. 
4.4.1 Linking the grass-roots and national 
anti-mining campaigns
Faced with this impending threat, ABAKATAF mobilised 
and organised its members and engaged the 
barangay-, municipal- and provincial-level officials 
in dialogue. When the mining companies pushed for 
entry into the community, ABAKATAF organised sit-
down picketing and hunger strikes at the entrance to 
the mining sites to prevent this. They actively sought 
audiences with key government officials from the 
barangay and the municipality and, as a result, both 
councils passed ordinances upholding their rights to 
their lands and accorded them protection.  
ABAKATAF then elevated its case to the provincial 
level, and beyond this, to the Mines and Geo-Sciences 
Bureau and to the president of the Philippines. These 
efforts captivated the attention of the nation, resulting 
in an outpouring of support for their cause. For a 
time, due to the initial efforts of ABAKATAF, mining 
companies were prevented from entering the mining 
site. But they re-strategised, using both informal and 
legal approaches to suppress ABAKATAF’s protests. 
Although cases were filed against the group, its 
members did not give up. Leveraging its initial victory, 
ABAKATAF sought the help of national organisations, 
including the Alternative Law Group, the Legal Rights 
and Natural Resources Center (LRC) / Friends of the 
Earth-Philippines. These legal rights groups were 
active in the national campaign against mining, and 
LRC filed an injunction ‘mandamus’ class suit against 
the mining firms, and against government officials in 
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. 
This became a test case for the new Supreme Court-
promulgated ‘Rules of Procedure for Environmental 
Cases’, and the first of its kind in Mindanao. 
ABAKATAF and LRC employed a people-led legal 
strategy, with the community members filing cases 
themselves, with technical and legal help from LRC. On 
the local front, ABAKATAF’s actions reaped victories. 
As well as being a test case for the new rules, it was 
also the first to be granted a temporary environmental 
protection order.  
Meanwhile, LRC was instrumental in sustaining interest 
in the grass roots-level campaign and maximising 
support from related NGOs. It helped ABAKATAF 
effectively coordinate a media campaign, and it 
maximised its international network to focus on the 
plight of the community. LRC submitted regular reports 
to Friends of the Earth International and the Philippine 
Indigenous Peoples’ Links, a UK-based organisation 
supporting indigenous peoples in the Philippines, about 
the activities and campaigns of communities. These 
fed into the international community’s information 
resources about the struggle against mining. 
While there was an active movement at the grass-
roots level, higher-level efforts – headed by more 
technically savvy CSOs – continued to push for mining 
policies that would benefit grass-roots communities. 
Coordinated grass-roots efforts fed the national anti-
mining campaign with the necessary on-the-ground 
information to use in advocacy at the Philippine 
Congress and in consultative meetings with the 
executive branch of government, involving the Office 
of the President and the Department of Environment 
and Natural Resources. This work eventually resulted 
in a moratorium on the issue of mining rights, and the 
streamlining of rules on mining. 
4.4.2 Lessons for vertically integrated 
advocacy 
• ABAKATAF recognised its limitations as a CBO, 
and therefore invested efforts in seeking wider 
support from the Mindanao region and from national 
organisations involved in the anti-mining campaign.
• ABAKATAF maximised integration at various levels 
through coalescing with national organisations, thus 
ensuring legal, technical and sometimes financial 
support to attain the goals of its anti-mining 
campaign. 
4.5 Campaigning for the rights of 
indigenous peoples 
Benedict G. Nisperos and Romeo Saliga 
The campaign for indigenous peoples’ rights in the 
Philippines is both pioneering and longstanding. 
The Philippines was one of the first countries to 
adopt a law protecting indigenous peoples’ rights; 
the country’s highest court recognised their rights 
over their land more than a century ago. Indigenous 
peoples’ claims for self-governance and the use of 
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their ancestral lands has been the driving force of 
their continuing struggle, which has overlapped with 
other rights-based campaigns on themes such as 
the environment, participation in governance, gender 
equality and peace. Some of the country’s indigenous 
peoples’ groups focus on specific issues. One example 
is the Teduray Lambangian Women’s Organisation, 
Inc. (TLWOI), an indigenous people’s organisation 
led by women. TLWOI operates in Maguindanao 
province, the regional centre of the Autonomous 
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and a stronghold 
of the Muslim struggle for autonomy. In this context, 
TLWOI faces substantial, multi-layered challenges 
in mainstreaming indigenous women’s rights in 
governance. One layer is the challenge of fulfilling the 
day-to-day concerns – such as access to livelihoods, 
education and other basic services – faced by 
indigenous peoples. 
Another layer of struggle is for women’s rights, 
traditionally disregarded in highly patriarchal 
indigenous communities. TLWOI engaged with 
different levels of government, through varying 
means, in order to advocate for these rights. TLWOI 
worked for indigenous peoples’ rights in general, and 
indigenous women’s rights in particular. It made its 
demands for basic social services through claiming 
spaces for representation at the local through to the 
national level. It represented indigenous peoples’ 
interests in key decision-making bodies by taking 
advantage of spaces shared with government. It 
has succeeded in lobbying for the passage of local 
ordinances advancing indigenous peoples’ rights – 
like the roll-out of early marriage counselling, and 
the allocation of funds for gender and development 
programmes – and allotting resources for basic 
services for indigenous peoples at the barangay and 
municipal levels. 
TLWOI was successful in lobbying for the recognition 
of indigenous peoples’ rights in the ARMM regional 
assembly. At the national level, the group’s most 
significant contribution was the inclusion of 
indigenous women’s rights in the Magna Carta 
of Women, enacted in 2009. It also represented 
indigenous people’s interests in national talks about 
the establishment of a Bangsamoro regional entity. 
4.5.1 Campaigning and organising 
strategies 
TLWOI conducted public education as an organising 
strategy and tool for building the consciousness 
of indigenous peoples’ and indigenous women’s 
rights. Community organising was strongest at the 
local level, and was strengthened by the constant 
constituency visits made by the organisation’s village 
point person. 
The use of modern communication technology, 
television appearances and radio programmes further 
bolstered community organising. TLWOI also took 
advantage of community organising as a way of getting 
feedback from the ground. TLWOI has a broad base of 
active support groups. It federated into 35 community-
based Téduray and Lambangian women’s organisations 
in six municipalities in Maguindanao province, 
highlighting the important role of women in community 
development. To better serve its constituents, 
there is also a functioning secretariat based at the 
organisation’s headquarters in Cotabato City. 
TLWOI is able to navigate policy spaces at different 
levels with ease by collaborating with established 
organisations with more resources. These include 
other indigenous peoples’ organisations that take 
advantage of available spaces at all levels of the 
government. TLWOI has collaborated with a wide 
spectrum of academic, civil society, development 
and religious organisations, including the National 
Federation of Rural Women, the Asia Foundation, the 
United Nations Human Rights Commission, the Centre 
for Peace and Conflict Studies, the European Union 
and Notre Dame University. 
It works with these partner organisations on policy 
advocacy, community development, capacity-building 
and education. Partners also provide technical and 
financial assistance. Through continuing engagement 
from the local level up to the national level, TLWOI has 
established its reputation as one of the most reliable 
sources for policy proposals regarding indigenous 
peoples. In engaging with the government, TLWOI 
has claimed space for representation where it can 
voice the issues and concerns of its members. At the 
local level, from the municipal up to the regional level, 
officers conduct dialogues with local officials through 
the local development councils and poverty response 
action teams. At the national level, they represent the 
interest of indigenous peoples at the National Anti-
Poverty Commission and the Bangsamoro Transition 
Commission. 
TLWOI lobbies for line agency support for the social 
services that indigenous peoples need to sustain their 
day-to-day living. To strengthen their participation in 
governance, it also participates in the electoral process 
by campaigning for candidates from its communities. 
4.5.2 Lessons for vertically integrated 
advocacy 
• TLWOI recognises that engagement with the 
government is not limited by the size of an 
organisation, and that creativity in building vertically 
integrated networks and identifying strategic 
partnerships is key to effective campaigning.
• Identifying and engaging with the right political 
power at each level of government is important in 
achieving results.  
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4.6 Advancing reproductive health 
rights 
Marlon Lara Cornelio 
In 2012, the Philippines finally enacted the Responsible 
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act, widely 
known as the RH law. This guarantees universal 
access to methods of family planning, age-appropriate 
reproductive health and sexual education, and 
maternal and reproductive health services. While the 
law recognises that abortion is illegal, it mandates 
the government to ensure that women who need care 
for post-abortive complications get humane, non-
judgemental and compassionate treatment. 
The passage of the RH law was a landmark case in 
the Philippines, where Catholics comprise about 
80% of the population. It was considered a major 
victory for women’s groups and a resounding defeat 
of the hegemonic Catholic Bishops’ Conference of the 
Philippines (Estrada-Claudio 2015). 
The campaign for the RH law was diverse, broad 
and multi-sectoral. Within the reproductive health 
movement, various networks and organisations took up 
the cudgels of the campaign. This case study focuses 
on the story of Likhaan Centre for Women’s Health, part 
of the Reproductive Health Alliance Network (RHAN). 
It shares experiences and lessons from the successful 
campaign, looking at the initiatives and actions that 
took place at different levels of policy-making. 
4.6.1 Civil society organisations and the 
campaign for reproductive health rights
Established in 1995, Likhaan is an NGO composed of 
grass-roots women and men, and health advocates and 
professionals. It provides health education and services to 
women and young people in marginalised communities. 
For the RH campaign, Likhaan focused on consolidating 
community support through intensive information, 
education and communication campaigns and community 
meetings, and conducted capacity-building training 
for community women to engage in RH policy debates. 
It also assisted in formulating ideas on how RH clinics 
could work, based on the experience of other local RH 
clinics. In 2003, it helped to federate women’s and youth 
groups from its different communities into a common 
platform for community groups advocating for RH, 
among other issues. For its part, RHAN – the oldest RH 
rights monitoring and advocacy network – was formed 
in 2001 by the Population Commission, the Family 
Planning Organisations of the Philippines, the Philippine 
Legislators’ Committee on Population and Development, 
and the Philippine NGO Council of Population, Health and 
Welfare.  
Through sustained policy research and active public 
opinion-making that targeted different audiences – 
the general public, other stakeholders and members 
of congress – the campaign was able to shape public 
opinion in its favour. It engaged multi-sectoral groups 
from the academic, medical and scientific communities, 
as well as religious groups and those from the business 
sector, in order to solicit their support for the RH bill. 
RHAN also engaged the Catholic Church in tit-for-tat 
debate in a range of venues. 
The RH campaign was well integrated with different 
government agencies from local to national – and even 
international – levels. The main arena for contestation 
was the legislative body, both locally and nationally. 
The executive branch of government under the Aquino 
administration was supportive, and actively campaigned 
for RH rights. At lower levels of government, legal 
recourse was taken against local ordinances and 
executive orders that advocates found contrary to RH or 
women’s rights. 
The campaign drew heavily on international influences, 
particularly international conventions. The 1994 
International Conference on Population and Development 
shifted the framing of the campaign from population 
control to RH rights. This shift changed the dynamics of 
the game and attracted more players to the side of the 
RH campaign. The RH campaign demonstrated effective 
policy monitoring and advocacy to uphold the rights of 
women and young people. 
Early on in the campaign, RHAN worked with government 
champions within the executive and legislative branches. 
It spearheaded various mobilisations, both at the 
national and local levels, that developed, harnessed and 
demonstrated support and created national pressure for 
the passage of the RH Bill. Tipping the balance in favour 
of RH was the strong leadership of the President Benigno 
Aquino III, who certified the bill as urgent, and personally 
lobbied in Congress for its passage (Ocampo 2014). 
When the RH law was finally passed, it was challenged in 
the Supreme Court. Though the high tribunal eventually 
ruled in its favour, its implementation was effectively 
delayed. After the legal victory in the Supreme Court, RH 
advocates turned their attention to implementation of the 
law. At present, Likhaan is part of a multi-departmental 
committee, the National Implementation Team, created 
by the Department of Health and including several CSO 
representatives, to monitor the implementation of the RH 
law. Likhaan is the CSO representative on the national 
secretariat, which coordinates CSO engagements and 
inputs to RH implementation, including the booking of 
CSO outputs.  
4.6.2 Lessons for vertical integration
• Vertical integration can be costly and resources 
are needed to maintain and run networks. In 
this campaign, there was funding from local and 
international partners; this was mirrored by the 
labour of committed activists and grass-roots 
women who sustained their activism with very 
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limited financial means.
• Vertical integration was facilitated by RH advocates 
who brought together important government 
officials.
• The RH campaign was not designed to be vertically 
integrated, but instead adapted to opportunities 
and challenges. Although there was vertical 
integration in some parts of the campaign, it has 
also been described as ‘rhizomatic’ (Estrada-Claudio 
2015) – a complex network of intersecting and 
non-intersecting organisations that includes both 
horizontal and vertical integration. 
4.7 Building disaster-resilient 
communities 
Marlon Lara Cornelio 
This case study summary looks into the advocacy 
campaign of the Disaster Risk Reduction Network 
Philippines (DRRNetPhils), which was directed at the 
passage, implementation and review of the 2010 
Disaster Risk Reduction Management (DRRM) Act. 
It examines the interaction of various initiatives and 
actions at different levels of policy-making, from 
the local to the national, introducing experiences 
and lessons from the campaign. It shows how using 
the vertical integration approach could be useful in 
framing and analysing similar monitoring and advocacy 
campaigns. 
Prior to the passage of the DRRM Act, the primary law 
covering disaster management in the country was an 
outdated Presidential Decree (PD 1566), enacted by 
the dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1978. The DRRM Act 
represented a paradigm shift in DRR and response, 
moving from an approach limited to the reactive 
management of disasters to a recognition of the need 
for a holistic approach to reducing risks and responding 
during emergencies (Scriven 2013). It included 
provision for a Disaster Risk Management (DRM) Fund, 
which also covers climate change adaptation initiatives, 
and civil society participation in DRRM councils at the 
national, regional, local and grass-roots / village levels. 
The passage of the DRRM Act took more than a 
decade of patient and persistent engagement with 
the legislative process. While there had been earlier 
campaigns by various groups, DRRNetPhils is widely 
credited as being a crucial advocate for the passage 
of the DRRM Act (Ibid.). It provided a strong, broad, 
persistent and consolidated network that influenced 
policy. 
4.7.1 Building a national coalition
As a national formation, DRRNetPhils brought together 
more than 300 CSOs, communities, practitioners 
and advocates adhering to the Hyogo Framework 
for Action on DRRM and implementing a community-
based DRM approach. It included members from 
academic institutions and government agencies, local 
government units (LGUs) and various LGU leagues. 
The focus on a common aim helped the network’s 
membership to build agreement and consensus and, 
in turn, collectively advocate for change. The concrete 
nature of the target was seen as crucial to creating 
cohesion within the network: without this, it would have 
been a disparate group of heterogeneous actors (Ibid.). 
The coalition was helped by champions inside 
government, in both the executive and legislative 
branches, who proved critical in the passage of the 
legislation (Dela Cruz 2015). International agreements, 
such as the Hyogo Framework, also strongly influenced 
the new law. Some observers argue that it was Mother 
Nature herself who provided the ‘game changer’ for 
the passage of the act. The devastation wrought on the 
Philippines by Typhoon Ketsana / Tropical Storm Ondoy 
in 2010 provided a shock effect and showed the urgent 
need for changes in the law (Dela Cruz 2015). However, 
it was DRRNetPhils that undertook coalition-building 
after this shock, both within the shared constituencies 
of its members and in other cross-sectoral formations. 
It then used coalition-building as a key strategy in 
creating a constituency for the passage of the DRRM 
Act. 
DRRNetPhils served various purposes, providing a 
unified public education strategy, a venue for shared 
learning and exchanges between both local and 
national organisations, and a forum for information 
dissemination, consultation and consolidation on issues 
and positions. Crucially, it was present at both local and 
national levels. At the community level, DRRNetPhils 
undertook awareness-raising and capacity-building 
on DRR and policy-making. Local communities were 
also involved in the preparation of local and national 
development plans, and provided inputs to the draft of 
the DRRM bill.  
DRRNetPhils consciously sought to bring practical 
experience from grass-roots organisations into 
legislative discussions. Furthermore, it engaged 
the scientific community in providing evidence 
to committee hearings. It also pushed for local 
ordinances, and modelled community-based DRM 
through the efforts and actions of its member 
organisations. The interface between the DRRNetPhils 
campaign and the state was pronounced at both local 
and national levels. At the national level, the concerted 
efforts of DRRNetPhils members were critical for the 
passage of the Act. Once it was passed, DRRNetPhils 
members became part of national and local DRRM 
councils, focused on the implementation and 
monitoring of the Act. 
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4.7.2 Lessons for vertically integrated 
campaigning
• One of the challenges of building the coalition and 
cultivating champions in government was the lack 
of coordination among government agencies. Before 
the Act was passed, although the campaign was 
vertically integrated, government approaches to 
DRRM were not. A vertically integrated civil society 
campaign can provide poorly integrated government 
agencies with a model for well-integrated ways of 
working.
• DRRNetPhils was a mechanism for both horizontal 
and vertical integration: internally, it organised 
itself to build muscle for legislative advocacy, while 
externally it mirrored the coordination of local and 
national initiatives.  
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5. Synthesis: lessons from vertically 
integrated reform campaigns in the 
Philippines 
Francis Isaac and Joy Aceron   
5.1 Introduction 
In the preceding chapters of this report, we have 
examined a number of vertically integrated, citizen-
led campaigns that have achieved significant reform 
victories in the Philippines. These cases were 
scrutinised in order to better understand the factors 
that had enabled these ‘successful’ initiatives to attain 
their objectives at specific periods in time.  
To recap, the seven selected initatives (discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 4) focused on monitoring 
textbook delivery, agrarian reform, housing for the 
urban poor, halting corporate mining operations, 
protecting and promoting the rights of indigenous 
peoples, advancing reproductive health rights, and 
supporting disaster-resilient communities. They were 
selected for the following reasons. 
1. They had multiple levels of engagement involving a 
variety of actors employing a broad set of strategies 
– including grass-roots organising, collective 
protests, coalition-building, civil society organisation 
(CSO) monitoring, policy advocacy and legal 
recourse. 
2. They had been relatively successful in achieving 
concrete and tangible reforms – through passing 
progressive policies, monitoring government 
performance, or ensuring the representation of 
marginalised groups in decision-making bodies. 
3. They had attained national prominence.
4. They were willing to participate in the study.
5. In total, they provided a cross-section of Philippine 
society by offering a diverse range of issues, 
featuring a wide array of actors that employ different 
modalities of engagement. 
To better understand these seven campaigns, we used 
vertical integration (discussed fully in Chapter 2) as 
an analytical tool to uncover the complex dynamics 
involved in each citizen-led reform effort. This synthesis 
chapter reflects on vertical integration as an analytical 
framework, as a strategic approach to accountability, 
and as a critique of mainstream practices in the 
accountability field. It concludes by looking across 
all seven case studies and discussing their common 
features.  
5.2 Vertical integration as an 
analytical framework  
While previous studies often attribute reform victories 
to either ‘champions’ on top or to social mobilisation 
from below, vertical integration encourages a focus 
on the scale of an initiative and how societal groups 
engage various state actors at different periods in 
time. By scale, we refer to the interaction of the 
different levels of decision-making – from the local to 
provincial, national and international arena – for both 
the public sector and for civil society (Fox and Aceron 
2016: 3).  
This can be seen in the case of Textbook Count, which 
mobilised as many as 47 civil society organisations 
(CSOs) at the national and provincial levels. Though 
this initiative was jointly implemented by the 
Department of Education and Government Watch 
(G-Watch), actual monitoring work was done at the 
school level by volunteers from the Boy Scouts of the 
Philippines (BSP) and the Girl Scouts of the Philippines 
(GSP).  
Further local support was generated by linking up 
with Parent–Teacher Organisations (PTAs), barangay 
(village) officials, as well as community-based 
organisations to assist volunteers in their monitoring 
activities. BSP and GSP chapters at the city, municipal 
and provincial levels also assisted in the effort by 
facilitating the recruitment of volunteers and the 
dissemination of information.  
At the national level, G-Watch provided overall 
coordination while simultaneously undertaking cross-
sectoral coalition-building by “linking up a wide 
variety of organizations, including NGOs working on 
transparency and accountability, development NGOs, 
sectoral organizations, an election monitoring CSO, and 
scouting organizations” (Ibid.: 37).
This is also the case in the agrarian reform campaign in 
the Bondoc Peninsula that is being spearheaded by the 
Kilusang Magbubukid ng Bondoc Peninsula (Peasant 
Movement of Bondoc Peninsula) or KMBP – a district-
wide peasant federation composed of more than 40 
hacienda-based organisations. It receives assistance 
from the Quezon Association for Rural Development 
and Democratisation Services (QUARDDS), a local 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) that provides 
technical support to rural poor groups operating in the 
province of Quezon.  
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KMBP is also a member-federation of the Kilusan para 
sa Repormang Agraryo at Katarungang Panlipunan 
(Movement for Agrarian Reform and Social Justice) 
or Katarungan, which is a broader confederation 
of several province-based peasant formations. 
Katarungan, for its part, works hand-in-hand with 
the Rural Poor Institute for Land and Human Rights 
Services (RIGHTS Network) – a consortium of 11 local 
NGOs working on agrarian reform.  
By forging multiple partnerships, KMBP is able to 
sustain a highly integrated campaign that enables rural 
citizens to engage both state and non-state actors at 
the village, municipal, provincial, regional and national 
levels. Its member-organisations, for example, are able 
to effectively assert peasant rights at the village and 
municipal levels where actual land contestation occurs.  
KMBP is being assisted by QUARDDS in pursuing their 
land cases by engaging state agencies at both the 
municipal and provincial levels. Katarungan / RIGHTS 
Network then project these cases to the national 
level. These groups also support KMBP by facilitating 
dialogues with pertinent government agencies, 
establishing civil society allies and by organising 
international fact-finding missions.  
The campaign for the passage of the Reproductive 
Health (RH) Law was vertically integrated, involving 
national and local organisations that include health 
service providers, women’s organisations, sectoral 
groups, political parties and academic institutions. They 
later formed the Reproductive Health Alliance Network 
(RHAN), which launched a massive media campaign at 
the national level, while organising public information 
activities at the community level. While it actively 
lobbied the national legislature to pass the measure, 
it also made similar efforts with local governments, 
resulting in the enactment of local RH ordinances in 
Quezon City and in the province of Aurora.  
Similarly, the campaign for the passage of the Disaster 
Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) Law was 
spearheaded by a broad advocacy coalition called 
DRRNetPhils, which included more than 300 national 
and grass-roots-based CSOs. Apart from its lobbying 
efforts in Congress, the DRRNetPhils also engaged key 
departments of the executive branch, including the 
Office of Civil Defense which is the agency primarily 
responsible for disaster response, management and 
risk reduction. As it was engaging the government, 
DRRNetPhils sought the support of other civil society 
forces such as business groups, media organisations, 
academia and faith-based groups. At the local level, 
DRRNetPhils launched intensive public information 
campaigns and organised numerous forums in different 
schools and universities. It also engaged with several 
local governments, urging them to support the DRRM Bill.
When the law was finally enacted in 2010, the National 
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council was 
soon created to develop a comprehensive, community-
based approach to climate change adaptation and to 
disaster risk reduction and management. Chaired by 
the Secretary of Defense, the Council is a multi-agency 
and multi-sectoral body that includes representatives 
from government and civil society. DRRNetPhils is 
one of several civil society groups represented in the 
Council.  
Another vertically integrated initiative is the campaign 
to prevent mining operations in Anislagan – a village 
in the municipality of Placer, located in the province 
of Surigao del Norte. This effort began with the 
formation of the Anislagan Bantay Kalikasan Task 
Force (ABAKATAF), after the villagers learned that the 
corporate mining companies were planning to begin 
their operations in the area.  
They immediately sought the support of the local 
church, and began organising protest actions in front 
of the municipal hall and in the provincial capital. 
They also formed human barricades at the mouth of 
the road going to the mining site to prevent the entry 
of bulldozers and other heavy machinery. The village 
council responded by issuing a resolution banning 
mining operations in their area. For its part, the 
municipal government passed an ordinance placing the 
watershed and communal forest under their protection. 
ABAKATAF sought assistance from several CSOs 
based in Manila, such as the Legal Rights and Natural 
Resources Center, Alyansa Tigil Mina (Stop Mining 
Alliance) and the Alternative Law Group. The plight 
of Anislagan’s residents was also projected abroad 
through ABAKATAF’s links with international groups 
such as Friends of the Earth and Piplinks.  
The Teduray Lambangian Women’s Organisation Inc. 
(TLWOI) adopted a vertically integrated campaign to 
promote the rights of indigenous women. Operating 
in six municipalities and in the provincial capital of 
Maguindanao, TLWOI is a federation of 35 community-
based Téduray and Lambangian women’s organisations 
that undertake community organising at the grass-
roots level. It also conducts public education and 
awareness-raising activities at the municipal, provincial 
and regional levels.  
In addition, TLWOI is actively broadening its base of 
support by establishing allies at various levels. Notre 
Dame University, for instance, has been assisting the 
federation in its advocacy at the provincial level. It is 
also affiliated with the Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga 
Kababaihan sa Kanayunan (or National Federation 
of Rural Women), which provides technical support 
for policy advocacy and project management. At the 
international level, TLWOI maintains close links with 
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foreign-based groups and institutions such as The 
Asia Foundation, the United Nation Human Rights 
Commission, the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies 
and the European Union.  
Apart from alliance-building and organising work, the 
federation is engaging the state at various levels. This 
enabled TLWOI to convinced several barangays to 
allocate more resources to gender and development. 
It has also been assisting several municipalities in 
crafting their own local poverty reduction action plans.  
At the regional level, TLWOI has a seat in the ARMM 
Regional Legislative Assembly – the legislative branch 
of the government of the Autonomous Region in Muslim 
Mindanao (ARMM). In addition, TLWOI Executive 
Director Froilyn Mendoza has served in the Bangsamoro 
Transition Commission – the body authorised to draft 
the Bangsamoro Basic Law for the new Bangsamoro 
political entity, as agreed in the peace deal between 
the Philippine Government and the Muslim rebel group 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front.  
Like the other six initiatives, Damayan ng Maralitang 
Pilipinong Api (DAMPA, Philippines Poverty Relief) has 
been waging a vertically integrated campaign to protect 
the housing rights of the poor. Operating in at least six 
regions of the country, DAMPA has been organising 
poor communities around a number of common issues, 
while building partnerships at both the local and 
national levels.  
It has, for instance, assisted 31 informal settler families 
forge a ‘land-sharing’ deal with a large subdivision 
in the province of Bulacan. DAMPA has also enabled 
other informal settlers in Quezon City to acquire land 
through a variety of schemes. At the same time, it has 
successfully built a wide network of CSOs at both the 
national and international levels. To better secure the 
housing rights of their members, DAMPA has been 
engaging a number of local governments, as well as 
pertinent national government agencies. 
5.3 Vertical integration as a 
strategic approach to 
accountability  
By looking at the cases, we are able to affirm vertical 
integration’s main argument that pro-accountability 
initiatives are able to achieve more substantial 
victories and gain better tangible results system-wide 
if the approaches they use are strategic, multi-level 
and grounded in the actual power dynamics that are 
present in any accountability relationship.  
While tactical approaches are highly localised and 
‘society-side’ efforts to access information and project 
voice (Fox 2014: 10), strategic approaches “combine 
information access with enabling environments for 
collective action that can scale up and coordinate with 
governmental reforms that encourage actual public 
sector responsiveness to voice” (Ibid.: 19). This means 
mobilising societal forces in order to address an issue, 
while engaging the state at all possible levels.  
The implication of such an approach, as seen in all 
seven cases, is clear: by acquiring scale, the campaigns 
were able to generate broad support from societal 
forces while influencing the decision of important state 
actors, which then resulted in substantive reform gains. 
5.4 Vertical integration as a 
critique of mainstream practices  
While vertical integration allows us to understand 
how reforms are won, it also serves as a critique of 
mainstream practices in the accountability field. We 
have identified a number of these practices which the 
succeeding sections will discuss individually. 
5.4.1 The search for ‘best practices’  
There has been a tendency among accountability 
scholars, donors and practitioners to look for ‘best 
practices’ from other countries and replicate them in the 
Philippines. However, the specific circumstances that 
gave birth to these ‘models’ are not fully understood, 
and the conditions that led to their subsequent 
developments are not adequately discussed. As Fox 
points out, “social accountability processes and 
outcomes are heavily context-dependent”, which is why 
“one-size-fits-all, easily replicable tools” seldom offer 
strategic solutions (Ibid. 9).  
This is evident in the seven cases featured in this 
report. Reading through the cases, we find that each 
campaign was intended to address a specific issue or 
accountability gap, and that the strategies that were 
adopted were based on the results that each campaign 
wanted to achieve. Textbook Count, for example, 
which is concerned with the timely delivery of the right 
textbooks to the right schools focused on monitoring. 
KMBP, on the other hand, which was engaged in the 
struggle for land rights, used collective protest actions 
to pressure the Department of Agrarian Reform to 
implement land redistribution.  
5.4.2 Transparency + participation = 
accountability  
The idea that ‘transparency + participation = 
accountability’ is now a standard principle in the good 
governance community. Simply put, this formula means 
that accountability is achieved when information 
regarding government resources, procedures, decisions 
and transactions is made readily and publicly available 
(transparency), and when ordinary citizens actively 
take part in existing decision-making processes 
(participation).  
However, this notion is now being assailed for its 
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‘linear’ and ‘simplistic’ logic, which disregards the 
complex processes involved in accountability, and for 
its failure to take into account the reality of power 
dynamics (Halloran 2015). As the cases attest, state–
society engagements are always embedded in power 
relationships. In most instances, state officials will try 
to escape accountability by ‘squeezing the balloon’ 
(Fox 2007). This occurs when a person in authority 
refuses to take action on a particular request or 
demand from the citizens by stating that responsibility 
lies either with those at the top or with officials from 
below (Fox 2001).  
This practice of moving up and down the scale to justify 
government inaction is not, in any way, captured in the 
‘transparency + participation = accountability’ formula, 
which instead presents a linear (if not overly horizontal) 
image of accountability.  
5.4.3 Demand-side accountability versus 
supply-side accountability 
There are accountability advocates that either 
focus on supply-side accountability or demand-side 
accountability. The first refers to the “accountability 
supply provided by the state through anti-corruption 
bureaus, legislative oversight and open data” (Fox 
2014). This approach is often seen as less contentious 
since it allows state institutions to perform its 
supposed roles on their own.  
Supply-side accountability was championed by the 
World Bank during the latter part of the 2000s, on 
the premise that demand tends to follow supply. They 
were, in other words, assuming that citizens’ interest 
in participation will likely increase once reforms are in 
place and government information is made available to 
the public.  
However, supply-side approaches are often not enough 
to induce reforms, since state actors follow certain 
routines that generally perpetuate existing power 
relations. In most instances, officials are jolted into 
action if there is a strong demand from societal forces 
to improve government service, enact a new policy, 
or change the existing rules. This approach is known 
as demand-side accountability, which refers to the 
actions undertaken by citizens to elicit responses from 
state institutions in order to address specific issues or 
accountability gaps (Ibid. 2014). The cases included in 
this collection all used this approach at certain points, 
in the form of lobbying, dialogue, mobilisations and 
collective protest action.  
This is the case, for example, of the RH campaign 
when its supporters finally convinced a majority of 
legislators to pass the measure after 15 years of 
intensive lobbying and countless mobilisations. Societal 
demand from anti-mining groups also explains why 
the municipal council of Placer adopted an ordinance 
protecting the town’s watershed and communal forest; 
and why President Benigno Aquino III issued Executive 
Order No. 79 in 2012 that bans mining activities in 
certain protected areas. 
However, demand-side accountability would not suffice 
in achieving reforms. Not only should there be demand 
per se, but it should be expressed at all levels in order 
to forestall any attempt to squeeze the balloon. The 
efficacy of demand-side accountability is also enhanced 
when citizens are able to maximise the openings 
provided by the state. In other words, demand-side 
accountability and supply-side accountability are two 
complementary approaches that can be used either 
separately or in combination at different levels at 
particular periods of time to advance possible reform 
gains. Or as Gaventa points out, there is a need to work 
on “both sides of the equation” (2002).  
5.4.4 Long versus short route to 
accountability 
In the 2000s, the World Bank promoted an approach 
called the short route to accountability which “links 
citizens directly to service providers, through various 
oversight and voice mechanisms” (Fox 2014: 12). It 
assumes that ‘government failures’ are primarily local, 
which requires exclusively local responses. This was 
meant as a critique to the long route to accountability 
since it is not able to immediately address government 
failures.  
In contrast, the electoral process plays a central part 
in the long route, wherein citizens (as the ultimate 
holders of power) delegate authority to their elected 
representatives who then govern bureaucracies 
that deliver needed social services. The World Bank 
criticised this approach, arguing that voters would 
have to wait for the next round of elections before 
they can exact accountability, either by electing pro-
reform candidates or by removing poorly performing 
politicians.  
However, recent studies suggest that government 
failures are not locally isolated issues, but are 
“distributed all the way up the governance ‘supply 
chain’” (Ibid. 2014: 11). This means that “the short 
route to accountability has turned out to be much more 
indirect than initially postulated, and its success may 
depend on making the long route more responsive as 
well” (Ibid.: 31–32).  
5.4.5 Horizontal accountability and 
vertical accountability  
Other approaches used in the governance community 
are horizontal accountability and vertical accountability. 
The first refers to the institutional mechanisms of 
checks, balance and oversight within the state. 
Horizontal accountability, therefore, sets the standards 
of behaviour for state officials, monitors their actions 
and imposes sanctions in case of indiscretion.  
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Vertical accountability, on the other hand, “refers 
to political accountability relations between citizens 
and their elected representatives” (Ibid.: 12). In 
this approach, elections are viewed as “the primary 
institution of vertical accountability”, though 
“reinforced by civil society efforts to encourage 
accountable governance” (Fox 2007: 31).  
Using vertical integration as an analytical framework, 
we can identify two limitations of these approaches. 
First, both horizontal accountability and vertical 
accountability approaches involve formal and 
institutional processes or rules. But as Fox points 
out, “much of what counts as accountability takes 
place outside of formal institutions” (Ibid.: 32). 
Vertical integration is able to uncover these informal 
relationships by looking at the constituency or cross-
sectoral coalition-building efforts that campaigns 
undertake across the different levels to gain greater 
voice, legitimacy and influence. This is done using a 
variety of “tools, tactics and approaches ranging from 
media investigations and coverage to mass protests 
to leveraging traditional decision-making processes” 
(Halloran 2015: 2).  
Second, both horizontal and vertical accountability 
approaches are not able to address scale. By either 
focusing on state–citizen relations or on internal 
accountability processes of the state, both approaches 
fail to explain why national accountability reforms do 
not automatically ‘scale down’ to subnational and local 
levels, and why local accountability reforms do not 
always ‘scale up’ to influence higher levels (Fox 2014).  
5.4.6 Single, short-term tactics  
Because vertical integration uses a variety of strategies 
across the different levels of engagement, it is clearly 
at odds with the practice of employing a single, 
short-term tactic that is isolated from potentially 
complementary and supportive tactics. These tactics 
include the use of open data without the necessary 
support that would ensure that such figures or 
information will be used to ensure accountability and 
promote human rights. Fox pointed this out, stating 
that “it is unrealistic to assume that information that is 
not linked to credible pathways to change will overcome 
well-known obstacles to collective action” (Ibid.: 28).  
A similar tactic involves individualised citizen voice that 
is disconnected from organisations and movements. 
Of course, it is important that individual citizens, who 
have been excluded and marginalised, be given the 
freedom to share their thoughts and air their demands. 
However, individualised voices “have limited capacity 
to negotiate with authority about what to do about 
those new agendas” (Ibid.: 29). Therefore, the process 
of giving voice should include “not only large numbers 
of people speaking at once, but the consolidation of 
organizations that can effectively scale up deliberation 
and representation” (Ibid.: 29). In other words, “voice 
is most usefully understood as involving both the 
aggregation and the representation of the views of 
otherwise excluded citizens” (Ibid.: 29).  
5.5 Common features of the case 
studies: lessons for reform 
initiatives in the Philippines 
Reform victories and accountability gains are no 
easy feats. The seven campaigns included in this 
study demonstrate the scale and complexity that 
is required in making governments responsive and 
accountable to their citizens. By using the framework 
of vertical integration, we were able to have a better 
understanding of these initiatives, and how they 
engaged the different levels at different periods in 
time. We were also able to deduce the characteristics 
common to all the campaigns and how they provide 
lessons to other reform initiatives in the Philippines. 
These are discussed in the sections below.  
5.5.1 Multi-level advocacy responds to 
vertically integrated power structures  
A common feature of all the campaigns is that they are 
cognisant of how power is structured and exercised, 
and how it influences the interface of societal groups 
with state actors. As such, a vertically integrated 
approach mirrors the operations of power and the 
vertically integrated nature of power relationships.  
In a 2014 paper, Fox argued that, “corruption and 
social exclusion are produced by vertically integrated 
power structures” (Ibid.: 33). This is the reason why 
anti-accountability forces are “often quite effective 
at isolating, neutering and rolling back incremental 
pro-accountability initiatives or institutional enclaves” 
(Fox and Aceron 2016: 2). To address this challenge, 
Fox suggests that pro-accountability citizens’ groups 
develop “parallel processes that are also vertically 
integrated” (2014: 33).  
By adopting such an approach, pro-accountability 
forces are able to respond appropriately to ‘power’. 
This is done by engaging different levels of governance, 
using multiple strategies involving constituency-
building and interfacing with the state. Whenever 
anti-accountability forces block the reform efforts of 
ordinary citizens, they could respond by either going up 
or down the scale in order to overcome such obstacles. 
When government officials attempt to escape 
accountability by squeezing the balloon, societal actors 
can then engage the different levels so as to ensure 
that the state will respond to their demands.  
This is the case in the ongoing land reform campaign in 
the Bondoc Peninsula, where poor farmers engage both 
state and non-state actors at the village, municipal, 
provincial, regional and national levels. Spearheaded 
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by KMBP and their allies from the Katarungan / RIGHTS 
Network, the campaign gained international attention 
by partnering with the International Peace Observers 
Network, an independent human rights organisation 
based in Germany.  
The campaign against large-scale mining is also 
vertically integrated, with ABAKATAF involved in 
grass-roots organising work and local government 
engagements, while Alyansa Tigil Mina is focused on 
policy advocacy at the national level. These efforts have 
persuaded the municipal government of Placer, Surigao 
del Norte to protect their watershed and communal 
forest. In the same vein, several local governments 
from the province of South Cotabato have decided to 
ban open-pit mining in their respective areas. Alyansa 
Tigil Mina is also pursuing strategic litigation, with 
several cases now filed before the Supreme Court and 
in the lower courts.  
Other groups like TLWOI have exhibited sophistication 
in engaging both national and local state agencies 
to advance the rights of indigenous peoples and 
indigenous women. It has considerable experience 
in legislative lobbying since it was one of the groups 
that campaigned for the enactment of the Indigenous 
Peoples’ Rights Act and the Magna Carta for Women. It 
has also been working with various local governments 
to utilise their 5% local gender and development fund 
for women’s livelihoods.1  
For their part, DAMPA was able to turn their campaign 
for decent and affordable housing into a vertically 
integrated initiative by engaging various government 
agencies at different levels. This is because different 
state bodies are assigned to address specific aspects 
of the housing issue. At the same time, DAMPA 
encourages its local member-organisations to engage 
their respective local governments for their housing 
and shelter-related concerns.  
Similarly, the vertically integrated character of the 
Textbook Count campaign was pivotal in its success. 
With CSOs covering all the critical stages of the 
textbook delivery programme (from procurement 
to distribution) at different levels, the Department 
of Education sees that it complies with standards 
of quantity, quality and process. This has prevented 
pilferages and has helped ensure the efficient delivery 
of textbooks. The campaign was also able to identify 
high-level champions in the Department of Education 
who provided the necessary ‘political support’ that 
pushed lower-level education officials to actually 
encourage CSO participation.  
The passage of the RH Law was another massive 
campaign involving coordinated actions from the 
community to the national and international levels. 
Most of the groups that were involved in this initiative 
were part of a loose national network called RHAN, with 
sub-networks at the local level. While RHAN developed 
the overall strategy for the campaign, grass-roots-
based groups, on the other hand, linked the issue of RH 
to local concerns. By vertically integrating their efforts, 
the pro-RH groups were able to develop a campaign 
that had considerable support from various sectors at 
every level of society (Melgar 2014).  
But if all these campaigns were vertically integrated, 
this still begs the question: Why were they so?  
Based on the case studies, a campaign becomes 
vertically integrated as pro-reform and accountability 
forces confront, respond and grapple with the reality 
of power. Consequently, the drivers of integration can 
be broadly categorised into two types. The first one is 
designed as a countervailing tactic meant to neutralise 
elite resistance. The second type aims to maximise the 
reform initiatives of the state to improve its processes 
and enhance its performance.  
The countervailing tactic can be seen in the agrarian 
reform campaign, wherein the direction of integration 
often comes from the ground up. As peasant demands 
are challenged at the village level, they go to the 
municipal, and then to the provincial, and then to the 
national, and so on. Integration is also driven by the 
fact that landowner power is vertically integrated, 
with haciendas covering several barangays and 
municipalities. Their influence also stretches up to 
the provincial and national levels, covering different 
bureaucracies and the three branches of government.  
A similar situation can be observed in the RH campaign, 
wherein RH groups were compelled to integrate 
their efforts to overcome conservative resistance. 
The strongest opposition came from the Catholic 
Church, which has considerable influence because of 
its vertically integrated organisational structure with 
thousands of parishes at the local levels, and with 
dioceses and archdioceses at the top. Its clout can also 
be felt even in the state, with several conservative local 
governments passing ordinances that ban the sale of 
condoms and artificial family planning methods. This 
prompted the need for a national RH law to prevent 
similar restrictions at the local level.  
In the case of the anti-mining campaign, small and 
isolated communities (mostly in the hinterlands) 
had to integrate with grass-roots communities and 
national-based organisations to overcome the steady 
encroachment of large mining firms. The campaign 
meant to address their lack of technical skills and 
capacity, which the more sophisticated advocacy 
groups based in the country’s city centres can provide.  
On the other hand, Textbook Count is an example of the 
second type of driver that aims to maximise the reform 
openings of the state. It was conceptualised at a time 
when international donor agencies were becoming 
increasingly concerned with government corruption. To 
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address this issue, they soon awarded grants to several 
civil society groups, such as G-Watch, to promote social 
accountability. At around the same time, the General 
Procurement Reform Act was signed into law on July 
22, 2002, which provides for CSO representation in 
the procurement process. These two policy openings 
at the international and national levels ultimately gave 
G-Watch the opportunity to partner with the Department 
of Education and initiate Textbook Count.
Similarly, the TLWOI’s campaign for indigenous 
peoples’ rights has been maximising the favourable 
policy environment that now exists. As an organisation, 
TLWOI actively seeks representation for indigenous 
peoples in decision-making bodies at local, regional 
and national levels that have been identified in the 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act and in the Magna Carta 
for Women.  
Interestingly, women have played pivotal roles in the 
exercise of this vertically integrated citizen power in 
the campaigns studied. Whether gender is a significant 
variable in the adoption or practice of vertical 
integration in advocacy campaigns would need to be 
explored in further research. 
5.5.2 Many levels of engagement, a wide 
variety of actions  
It is clear from the earlier discussions that the power 
of anti-reform forces is vertically integrated, with allies 
from both inside and outside the state. The seven 
campaigns responded to this challenge by adopting a 
number of measures that enhanced their effectiveness. 
Each campaign had multiple levels of engagement, with 
varying intensities of engagement per level, employing 
a wide variety of strategies depending on the existing 
challenges and opportunities.  
By studying each of the cases, we can identify three 
common features, which were central to how the 
initiatives achieved their key victories. These are: (1) 
engagement at multiple levels of governance; (2) 
the use of multiple approaches and strategies (such 
as policy advocacy, policy monitoring, grass-roots 
organising, coalition-building and public education); 
and (3) engagement with multiple actors from both the 
state and civil society.  
We also observed that the types of actions, as well 
as the drivers and mechanisms of integration, are 
largely informed by: (1) the intensity of engagement 
at a particular level; (2) the kind of approach that was 
employed; and (3) the kind of results that they were 
aiming for.  
In the agrarian reform campaign for instance, 
organising work is being done at both the barangay 
and municipal levels. This is for two reasons: first, 
the struggle for land literally occurs on the ground; 
and second, success is measured by the size of the 
landholding that is subjected to redistribution and then 
given to the actual tillers. This then prompts the need 
for organising work at these two levels.  
At the same time, farmers form their own federations 
at the district, provincial and national levels.2 This is 
in order to: (1) multiply the strength of grass-roots–
peasant movements; and (2) to address the fact that 
landowner power is also vertically integrated, with 
allies at various levels of the state and in the three 
branches of government. Whenever necessary, farmers 
undertake legal actions at the municipal up to the 
national levels, thereby following court procedures in 
the Philippines.  
Farmers also conduct public education campaigns 
targeting provincial- and national-level audiences. 
Limiting their audience, on the part of the farmers, 
is deliberate for two reasons. First, peasants on the 
ground are generally convinced of the need for agrarian 
reform since they are the intended beneficiaries of 
the programme. Second, their education campaigns 
are intended to be carried by commercial media 
organisations that usually operate at provincial and 
national levels.  
Information and communications technologies (ICTs) 
are utilised as part of their public education and 
information strategy, though their use is largely limited 
to the national level. They are generally used to inform 
the public of the condition in the Bondoc Peninsula 
and to generate their support. The limited role of ICTs 
could be attributed to the fact that many of the tech-
based approaches currently hailed as the solution to 
accountability problems are completely inappropriate 
and irrelevant to the lives of grass-roots people and 
how they address their collective problems.  
As for the other campaigns, longstanding initiatives, 
particularly on housing, anti-mining and indigenous 
peoples’ rights, have been pushing to either amend or 
totally overhaul the existing laws that continue to guide 
policies. However, no legislative breakthrough was 
made even after two decades of intense lobbying and 
advocacy. This prompted these three campaigns to give 
greater focus on policy implementation. In the absence 
of any new national law, the initiatives have challenged 
a number of local governments to enact local 
policy, whenever possible. In fact, several municipal 
governments have already issued ordinances banning 
mining operations in their respective localities.  
On the other hand, the RH and DRRM campaigns both 
began as legislative advocacies demanding national-
level actions. But with the stiff opposition of the 
very powerful Catholic Church and with DRRM being 
ignored by most legislators, these two initiatives began 
organising local-level actions designed to win grass-
roots support and gain the backing of other sectors. 
Local programmes and ordinances were highlighted to 
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provide Congress with RH and DRRM models that they 
could study and learn from. When the DRRM Act and 
the RH Law were finally passed, the campaigns then 
shifted from national-level policy advocacy to local-
level policy monitoring and implementation.  
For its part, Textbook Count was primarily designed as 
an engagement initiative with the executive branch of 
government (in this case, the Department of Education) 
to monitor textbook procurement and delivery. The 
focus of Textbook Count’s action is mainly at the school, 
division and national levels. It was supposed to cover 
procurements at the regional level as well. But this was 
soon seen as redundant since “DepEd procurement 
remains centralized, with textbooks and other large 
acquisition processes handled by their national office” 
(Fox and Aceron 2016: 29). To process the monitoring 
results and generate government response, G-Watch 
facilitated exchanges of experiences and problem-
solving sessions at the national level and with selected 
the Department of Education divisions.  
The programme had an advocacy component that is 
mainly designed to elicit responses from national-level 
decision-makers. The advocacy work undertaken at 
the division and school levels was intended to: (1) 
ensure CSO participation in textbook delivery; and 
(2) allow the school principals and contractors to 
respond immediately to the findings of the monitoring. 
The design also included legislative advocacy and 
engagement with public accountability agencies, when 
deemed necessary.  
All advocacy initiatives use media-based communication 
as part of their campaigns; the use of media is critical 
for adding pressure to duty bearers and powers-that-
be. Media is used to name and shame personalities 
and to make anomalies public. It is also a way to build 
constituencies as it creates awareness about the 
campaign. In the Textbook Count case, media was 
only used after the monitoring had taken place. Since 
Textbook Count operated on the concept of constructive 
engagement, all findings were first presented to 
Department of Education executives privately to give 
them ample time to respond to the findings. Reports 
to the media were made after the complete cycle of 
monitoring (that is, from planning to evaluation) had 
been conducted, and with the Department of Education’s 
official response already incorporated in the report. 
5.5.3 Multiple actors in coalition 
One feature common among the initiatives is their 
grass-roots organising component. While RHAN and 
DRRNetPhils did not undertake community organising 
on their own, these two campaign coalitions included 
membership-based organisations that have a strong 
grass-roots presence. This allowed both RHAN and 
DRRNetPhils to achieve scale even down to the grass-
roots level.  
Organising work was apparent in the case of Textbook 
Count which mobilised BSP and GSP volunteers, and 
with as many as 47 CSOs joining the campaign at both 
the national and local levels. This initiative was able to 
tap other community groups such as the local PTAs, as 
well as village officials. Textbook Count also undertook 
coalition-building at the national level, with G-Watch 
linking up with a wide variety of organisations such 
as development NGOs, anti-corruption groups, labor 
unions and other sectoral formations.  
Grass-roots organising is highly intense in the agrarian 
reform campaign, with most of the work being done at 
village and municipal levels. This is often undertaken 
by deploying community organisers to targeted 
barangays, who will then organise the community 
around the issue of agrarian reform. Coalition-building 
is another major component of the land rights struggle. 
At the provincial and national levels, for instance, the 
Katarungan / RIGHTS Network has built a network 
of allies that include the Catholic Church and human 
rights groups.  
For its part, DAMPA is known for its solid grass-roots 
base, with 12 founding chapters and four expanded 
chapters present in six regions of the Philippines. It 
has built a support coalition composed of faith-based 
groups, legal aid NGOs and the Philippine Red Cross. 
DAMPA is also a member-organisation of both RHAN 
and DRRNetPhils.  
On the other hand, ABAKATAF emerged organically as 
residents of Anislagan faced the threat of corporate 
mining in their area. Knowing that they could 
not confront the mining firms on their own, they 
eventually sought allies in Manila, particularly legal 
aid organisations such as Legal Rights and Natural 
Resources Center and the Alternative Law Groups. 
Similarly, TLWOI has a strong membership base, 
operating in Cotabato City and in six other 
municipalities of Maguindanao province. It also has 
several allies from other women’s groups, academia, 
think tanks and development aid agencies.  
By looking at their profiles, we can now claim that all 
the seven campaigns were able to mobilise multiple 
actors using multiple approaches at different levels. But 
with the many actions and actors involved across the 
scale, the question remains: who or what holds these 
elements together in an integrated set of actions?  
We can identify two common mechanisms that enabled 
the campaigns to achieve integration: (1) having a 
core team or secretariat; and (2) having a process 
that could federate the multiple efforts into a vertically 
integrated whole. A secretariat is important since 
it provides focus to a campaign by facilitating the 
communication and coordination process between 
social and civic actors working at different levels. A 
federation, on the other hand, provides the initiative 
55
RESEARCH REPORT Going vertical: citizen-led reform campaigns in the Philippines
with scale by forming a coalition of different forces.  
This is evident in the land reform campaign, wherein 
integration is often facilitated by agrarian NGOs that 
provide technical assistance to peasant formations. 
It also has peasant federations such as Katarungan 
and KMBP that are organised at the district, provincial 
and national levels. Such federations have regular 
assemblies wherein policies are discussed and leaders 
are elected.  
On the other hand, the RH and DRRM campaigns 
were each led by a large network of CSOs that had 
significant nationwide presence. These networks 
– namely RHAN and DRRNetPhils – each driven 
by respective secretariats, maximised the unique 
strengths of their member-organisations to address 
various campaign needs. Buklod Tao (People Unite), 
for example, concentrated on awareness-raising and 
local mobilisation for disaster response and relief, while 
the Ateneo School of Government focused on the legal 
aspects of DRRM.  
In the RH campaign, Likhaan was tasked with 
mobilising grass-roots support, while membership-
based organisations conducted community discussions 
and information campaigns. RHAN partnered with the 
Philippine Legislators’ Committee on Population and 
Development to orient legislative champions on the 
merits of the measure.  
Similarly, Textbook Count was able to mobilise 
hundreds of volunteers and a significant number of 
CSOs from the national to the school level in a vertically 
integrated, nationwide effort. The information gathered 
from the monitoring later became the basis for the 
recommendations that were submitted by G-Watch to 
the Department of Education.  
ABAKATAF, meanwhile, quickly realised the need for 
a coordinated approach early in their struggle. Their 
lack of technical capacity led them to seek assistance 
from Manila-based organisations. These groups then 
helped ABAKATAF project their issue to a national 
audience. In turn, villagers from Anislagan provided 
the Manila groups with the necessary insights, stories 
and information that helped the latter in crafting better 
informed policy suggestions. To coordinate all these 
efforts, Alyansa Tigil Mina was formed as an umbrella 
network for all anti-mining organisations.  
Though TLWOI is deeply involved in lobbying and 
organising work, it is able to coordinate all these efforts 
through a functioning secretariat. It also has a Board of 
Trustees that sets the organisational direction of TLWOI. 
With 35 community-based organisations, TLWOI has 
formed itself into a provincial federation that is present 
at both the municipal and village levels.  
Operating in at least 95 communities throughout the 
country, DAMPA is involved in community organising, 
training and education. By providing technical 
assistance to other urban poor groups, it is engaging 
with numerous local governments to ensure decent 
housing for their members. To coordinate all its efforts, 
DAMPA has a national secretariat as well as a website to 
provide its members with a quick source of information.  
However, integration does not always need to come 
from the centre; nor does it need to be deliberately 
facilitated by a particular person or mechanism. Unity 
around a common, concrete goal has an integrating 
quality, which is also found in a common appreciation 
of threats, risks and problems. Evidence, research 
and knowledge about an issue can also be factors in 
integrating actions.  
5.5.4 Activities based on analysis of the 
state and traditions of collective action 
All the initiatives we studied have undertaken 
implementation intervention and advocacy activities, 
but the particular focus on one or the other is in each 
case informed by their appreciation of the nature of the 
state and traditions of collective action. 
By closely studying the cases, we can develop this 
point further by classifying the campaigns according to: 
(1) different traditions of collective citizens’ action; and 
(2) whether they use implementation intervention or 
advocacy as their main approach.  
In the first type of classification, there are three 
traditions of collective citizens’ actions in the 
Philippines, with each tradition employing a different 
set of approaches for engaging the state. These 
traditions are categorised as progressive social 
movements, social accountability (SAcc) campaigns 
and hybrid initiatives.  
• Progressive social movements focus on advocacy, 
pressure politics, claim-making and rights assertion. 
The campaigns for agrarian reform, anti-mining and 
reproductive health fall under this category.  
• SAcc campaigns make use of the existing democratic 
space that advance the anti-corruption agenda 
to further open up the spaces for constructive 
engagement. Textbook Count falls under this 
category. 
• Hybrid initiatives are those that exhibit the 
characteristics of the first two initiatives, using both 
monitoring and pressure politics. The campaigns for 
housing, indigenous peoples’ rights and DRRM fall 
under this category.  
In the second type of classification, we have observed 
two broad approaches that the campaigns have 
used to achieve results: (1) policy advocacy; and (2) 
intervention in policy implementation.  
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Broadly speaking, policy advocacy is an approach 
involving pressure politics to influence the state. 
Intervention in policy implementation, on the other 
hand, occurs within the system, often taking the form 
of performance monitoring, participation in legally 
recognised bodies and mechanisms, mobilisation of 
assistance and services, as well as the filing of court 
cases.
A number of the CSOs in the case studies are also 
engaged in direct service delivery. Such activities can 
be categorised under the second approach, though 
these can possibly be done independently by the state. 
RH, anti-mining, agrarian reform, indigenous peoples’ 
rights and housing are mainly advocacy campaigns. 
Textbook Count, on the other hand, is the only one that 
mainly employed intervention in policy implementation. 
The campaign for DRRM employed both.  
Different traditions are associated with different 
approaches. Campaigns from the progressive social 
movement tradition are more inclined to use pressure 
politics or policy advocacy as their main approach. 
They are, therefore, less inhibited from using collective 
protest actions and other adversarial methods to elicit 
state response and influence government decisions. This 
does not mean, however, that they do not intervene in 
policy implementation. Rather, policy monitoring and 
policy implementation intervention are both included 
in their toolbox. But they prefer to use the first in most 
circumstances, rather than the second. To elaborate: 
compared to Textbook Count, the monitoring done 
by the other groups did not cover entire systems. 
Monitoring was more ad hoc or reactive to specific 
threats / problems, and was usually undertaken to 
mobilise social actors and public opinion as part of 
advocacy. This highlights the primacy of advocacy, 
rather than monitoring, as the main approach.  
While social accountability efforts in other contexts 
involve the use of an adversarial approach, in the 
Philippines social accountability initiatives, as observed 
in this study, tend to shy away from adversarial politics. 
Instead, they prefer to address problems together with 
the state, and often choose mainly problem-solving 
initiatives that curb corruption, boost state efficiency 
and enhance government performance. 
The differences in approaches by these various CSOs 
can be largely explained by how they view the state. 
Progressive social movement initiatives assert that elite 
interests have captured the state, and that reforming 
the state would often require pressure politics. SAcc 
initiatives assume that the state enjoys a certain 
degree of autonomy from societal forces and that it 
can act autonomously from vested elite interests. This 
viewpoint sees the state as an arbiter or umpire that 
balances clashing values and interests.  
For this reason, progressive social movements often 
use pressure politics and policy advocacy to advance 
their issues. Social accountability groups, on the 
other hand, engage state processes and work in close 
coordination with the government to collectively 
resolve identified issues or problems. Such approaches 
have implications on SAcc groups’ organising work, 
with progressive social movements focusing on 
community organising, compared to SAcc CSOs, which 
prefer networking and coalition-building with already 
existing groups.  
5.5.5 A transformative reform agenda, not 
short-term goals 
The seven initiatives have mainly produced two kinds 
of results: (1) policy adoption or policy change; or (2) 
improved and more effective policy implementation.  
The RH and DRRM campaigns both fall under the 
first category. The RH initiative sought to enact a 
comprehensive RH law; the DRRM campaign was an 
effort to have a new legal measure on DRRM.  
The rest are cases of civil society efforts to ensure 
effective policy implementation. DAMPA’s housing 
campaign, for example, focuses on the proper 
implementation of the Urban Development Housing 
Act. Their interventions are meant to guarantee 
that relocated families are fairly treated by housing 
authorities, and that basic services are available to 
the relocatees in their new communities.
The anti-mining campaign, on the other hand, 
uses existing laws to prevent large-scale mining 
operations in several localities by organising 
communities and by working with local government 
officials.  
For their part, the farmers of the Bondoc Peninsula 
continue to fight for land rights by exerting pressure 
on the Department of Agrarian Reform so that it 
could effectively implement the country’s agrarian 
reform law. By using a combination of pressure 
politics, rightful resistance3 and working with state 
reformers inside the Department, land redistribution 
has been actually carried out in certain areas.  
TLWOI, meanwhile, aims to advance the rights 
of indigenous peoples and indigenous women by 
maximising the participatory provisions of the 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act and of the Magna 
Carta for Women.  
Textbook Count, which is concerned with the timely 
delivery of the right quantity and quality of textbooks 
to the right schools, is a programme that focuses 
on monitoring government performance and service 
delivery. 
It must be pointed out, however, that some of these 
campaigns attempted to achieve both results at 
different points in their history, depending on what 
the context demanded. The case studies reveal how 
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the main goal of these campaigns has evolved over 
time, and how their objectives shifted from policy 
change to effective policy implementation and vice 
versa. The main victories that these campaigns have 
achieved are enumerated above.  
The Katarungan / RIGHTS Network actively 
campaigned for the passage of the Comprehensive 
Agrarian Reform Program Extension with Reforms 
Law (CARPER), which sought to extend the land 
reform implementation for another five years. This law 
was enacted in 2014.4 In the Bondoc Peninsula, the 
RIGHTS Network and its local peasant partners from 
KMBP have succeeded in shifting the control of more 
than 10,000 hectares of land to 3,800 poor farmers.  
TLWOI took part in the passage of relevant national 
and local policies that advance the rights of 
indigenous women. 
DRRM advocacy groups have succeeded in enacting 
a national DRRM Law. With this new legal framework 
in place, they are now engaging both national- 
and local-level DRRM councils, and are looking for 
communities that could be possible models of disaster 
preparedness and resilience.  
Similarly, with the passage of the RH Law, the 
members of the RHAN coalition shifted their work 
from policy advocacy to the equally important task of 
monitoring the implementation so as to ensure that 
adequate RH services are given to those who need it.  
The anti-mining campaign has gained the support of 
several local governments by passing measures to 
ban open-pit mining. Anti-mining advocates, however, 
are still continuing their attempt to have a new legal 
framework, by replacing the existing Mining Act with 
the Alternative Minerals Bill.  
And finally, Textbook Count has succeeded in reducing 
the textbook unit price from 80 to 120 Philippines 
Pesos (PHP) in 1999 to between PHP30 and PHP45 in 
2006–2007, and in shortening procurement process 
time by half. It also instituted a problem-solving 
component where policy changes in service delivery 
can be introduced. 
It is important to reiterate that all of the initiatives 
have tried to achieve both policy change and improved 
policy implementation at a given point in their history, 
depending on what is demanded by the context. 
Nonetheless they have registered clear success in only 
one.  
5.6 Concluding remarks  
This study looked at seven citizen-led reform 
campaigns that have achieved significant and 
substantial reform victories in recent years. 
Despite the complexity of each campaign, we were able 
to gain a better understanding of these initiatives using 
vertical integration, which focuses on scale and how 
societal groups engage various state actors at different 
periods in time. Through this lens, we recognised that 
all the seven campaigns had mobilised various societal 
forces to engage on multiple levels using multiple 
strategies and approaches in order to achieve reforms. 
We also concluded that pro-accountability initiatives 
Figure 3. The seven cases mapped according to result, main approach and tradition  
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are able to achieve more substantial victories and gain 
better tangible results system-wide if the approaches 
that they use are strategic, multi-level and grounded 
on the actual power dynamics that are present in any 
accountability relationship.  
This study is the first major attempt to use vertical 
integration to analyse citizens’ movements in the 
Philippines and to explore the lessons that can be 
derived from these initiatives. Our contribution is 
modest, to be sure, but we hope that our effort will 
encourage other scholars and practitioners to continue 
using this approach so that we can better understand 
that complex and dynamic process called change.  
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1  According to the Philippine Local Government Code, all local 
governments (from the village, to the municipality, the city 
and the province) are mandated to allocate 5% of their budget 
to gender and development projects. Local governments, 
however, are given considerable discretion in defining 
‘gender and development projects’.
2 National membership-based organisations are able to achieve 
scale by organising units or chapters at the different 
geographic levels. KMBP, for instance, is present in 40 
haciendas and is organised at both the municipal and village 
levels. On the other hand, NGOs like RIGHTS Network achieve 
scale by partnering with other civil groups that are operating 
below the national level.
3 Coined by Kevin O’Brien, rightful resistance is a form of 
popular contention that operates near the boundary of the 
law, while employing the rhetoric of the powerful to curb 
political and economic power. For more details of this 
approach, see O’Brien (1996). 
4 The original law called the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform 
Program (CARP) gave the government ten years to complete 
its land redistribution efforts. This was later extended for 
another ten years, thus resetting the deadline to 2008. When 
the law finally expired in December of that year, more than 
1.2 million hectares of agricultural lands were still waiting to 
be redistributed by the government to thousands of farmer-
beneficiaries. This prompted the campaign of peasant groups 
for the enactment of the CARP Extension Law, known in the 
Philippines as CARPER. 
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